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Burn After Viewing: 
The CIA’s Destruction of the Abu Zubaydah Tapes and 
the Law of Federal Records 
Douglas Cox? 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 6, 2007, the Central Intelligence Agency publicly 
disclosed that in 2005 it had destroyed videotapes of CIA interrogations of 
alleged terrorist Abu Zubaydah conducted in 2002.  It asserted that the 
destruction was “in line with the law.”1  The disclosure resulted in calls for 
congressional investigations;2 a motion for contempt in a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) suit by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU);3 emergency motions in Guantánamo detainee cases;4 questions 
about the case of Zacharias Moussaoui;5 and an angry op-ed from the 
chairmen of the 9/11 Commission.6  The crux of these public reactions – as 
with the criminal investigation that resulted – was primarily the narrow 
 
 ? Associate Law Library Professor, City University of New York School of Law. 
The author has represented individuals detained in Guantánamo and previously worked in 
military intelligence in the U.S. Army.  The views expressed are only those of the author and 
all of the information contained in this article is derived solely from unclassified sources. 
The author thanks Jay Olin and the FOIA staff at the National Archives, Sarah Havens, Julie 
Lim, K. Babe Howell, Angela Burton, Alizabeth Newman, Liliana Yanez, Nicole Smith 
Futrell, and Paul Cox for their assistance and thoughts. 
 1. See Press Release, Central Intelligence Agency, Director’s Statement on the Taping of 
Early Detainee Interrogations (Dec. 6, 2007), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-
releases-statements/press-release-archive-2007/taping-of-early-detainee-interrogations.html 
[hereinafter D/CIA 2007 Statement]. 
 2. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy and Sen. Arlen Specter to Michael 
Mukasey, Attorney General (Dec. 10, 2007) (inquiring about the destruction of the tapes), 
available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/121.pdf [hereinafter Leahy/Specter Letter]. 
 3. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt and Sanctions, ACLU v. Dep’t of Def. 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007) (No. 04-4151).  The motion continues to be litigated in 2011. See 
Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt and 
Sanctions, ACLU v. Dep’t of Def. (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011) (No. 04-4151). 
 4. See Abdullah v. Bush, 534 F. Supp. 2d 22, 23 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that 
Guantánamo detainee had “made sufficient showing, unrebutted by [the government], of a 
likelihood that some of the destroyed videotapes were evidence” subject to a 2005 
preservation order). 
 5. See U.S. v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 305-307 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing the 
relevance of the destroyed Abu Zubaydah tapes). 
 6. Thomas H. Kean & Lee H. Hamilton, Op-Ed, Stonewalled by the C.I.A., N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at A17. 
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issue whether the destruction of the tapes was illegal because they were 
relevant to pending or foreseeable cases or investigations.7 
At the same time, but with much less publicity, the National Archives 
and Records Administration (NARA) quietly dispatched a letter to the CIA 
questioning its compliance with more general, institutional obligations 
under the federal records laws that require preservation of records 
regardless of their relevance to ongoing proceedings.  “As you are aware,” 
NARA’s letter stated, “no Federal records may be destroyed except under 
the authorization of a records disposition schedule approved by the 
Archivist of the United States,” and NARA was “unaware of any CIA 
disposition authority” that covered the tapes.8  The CIA’s response was both 
unequivocal and unexpected.  “The bottom line,” a CIA spokesman 
asserted, “is that these videotapes were not federal records as defined by the 
Federal Records Act.”9 
This article examines the legal arguments underlying the CIA’s 
assertion that the tapes were not federal records, an assertion which, despite 
its considerable significance, has thus far gone largely unexamined.  The 
article argues that the CIA should have treated the tapes as records and, had 
it done so, the much publicized debates within the CIA and the White 
House over whether it was politically palatable to destroy them and 
questions about their relevance to ongoing cases and government inquiries 
would have been largely academic.  The federal records laws, properly 
applied, would have required the preservation of the tapes even in the 
absence of FOIA requests by the ACLU, pending Guantánamo detainee 
cases, or document requests from the 9/11 Commission. 
The federal recordkeeping statutes, collectively referred to as the 
Federal Records Act, are designed to ensure the “accurate and complete” 
documentation of the work of the government.10  Under the law, a federal 
“record” includes any “documentary material” – including videotapes – that 
documents official government business and that is “appropriate for 
preservation.”11  An agency may not destroy such records without approval 
from the Archivist of the United States, a requirement that recognizes that 
records may have value beyond the immediate needs of an agency and 
 
 7. See Decl. of John H. Durham at ¶4, James Madison Project v. CIA (D.D.C. June 9, 
2008) (No. 07-2306) (stating that the criminal investigation encompassed whether any 
person “obstructed justice,” “acted in contempt of court or Congress,” or whether “the 
destruction of the videotapes violated any order issued by any federal judicial officer”). 
 8. Letter from Paul M. Wester, Jr., Director, Modern Records Programs, NARA, to 
Joseph Lambert, Director, Information Management Services, CIA (Dec. 10, 2007), 
available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/1.pdf [hereinafter 2007 Wester Letter]. 
 9. Michael Isikoff, The CIA and the Archives: Did Tape Destruction Violate Records 
Law?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 21, 2007, http://www.newsweek.com/2007/12/20/the-cia-and-the-
archives.html. 
 10. 44 U.S.C. §2902(1) (2006). 
 11. 44 U.S.C. §3301 (2006). 
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acknowledges that, as the courts have noted, “agencies, left to themselves, 
have a built-in incentive to dispose of records relating to ‘mistakes.’”12 
The CIA’s determination that the tapes were not “records,” however, 
avoided these requirements altogether.  This interpretation of the law placed 
videotapes of Abu Zubaydah being waterboarded – the legality and efficacy 
of which constitutes one of the most important legal and moral debates in 
recent history – into the same category as “extra copies of documents 
preserved only for convenience of reference” and other “nonrecord” 
documents that can be destroyed without authorization.13  The CIA’s 
analysis of the legal status of the tapes at the very least raises a red flag that 
suggests that either the CIA’s interpretation of the recordkeeping laws is too 
narrow or that such laws need revision, or both.14 
Despite the implications of such issues for the CIA’s current and future 
obligation to preserve documentation of its intelligence operations, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal investigation into the destruction of 
the tapes put relevant inquiries by NARA and Congress on hold for nearly 
three years, a delay that had the effect of impairing their oversight.  
Criminal indictments for the past destruction of the interrogation tapes, 
even had they materialized, would not have remedied the more significant 
issue of the CIA’s ongoing interpretation of its recordkeeping 
responsibilities.  Despite the November 2010 announcement that the DOJ 
would not seek criminal charges for the destruction of the tapes,15 therefore, 
this article seeks to begin an examination of the CIA’s interpretation of its 
institutional responsibilities under the federal records laws in light of its 
treatment of the tapes, an examination that is not only ripe, but overdue.16 
 
 12. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 13. 44 U.S.C. §3301 (2006). 
 14. Moreover, the destruction of the interrogation tapes was not an isolated incident of 
questionable records preservation practices within the CIA. A NARA evaluation of CIA 
recordkeeping practices found, for example, a general tendency of CIA personnel to classify 
their documents improperly as nonrecord “soft” files that did not have to be preserved. 
NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., RECORDS MANAGEMENT IN THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 8, 25 (2000), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/fas/nara.pdf 
[hereinafter NARA EVALUATION]. 
 15. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement on the Investigation into the Destruction 
of Videotapes by CIA Personnel (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
2010/November/10-ag-1267.html. 
 16. Following the DOJ’s announcement, NARA notified the CIA that it was resuming 
its inquiry into whether “an unauthorized destruction” of federal records occurred.  Letter 
from Paul M. Wester, Jr., Director, Modern Records Programs, NARA, to Joseph Lambert, 
Director, Information Management Services, CIA (Nov. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/11.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Wester Letter]; see also Michael Isikoff, 
CIA Faces Second Probe over Videotape Destruction, MSNBC, Nov. 10, 2010, 
http://www.msnbc. msn.com/id/40115878/ns/us_news-security/. 
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Part I of this article provides a timeline of the creation and destruction 
of the interrogation tapes based on publicly available CIA documents that 
repeatedly reference the issue whether the tapes were records.  Part II 
briefly outlines the legal framework governing the creation, preservation, 
and disposal of federal records, and the exceptions for “nonrecords” and 
“working files,” and raises the troubling possibility that the CIA may 
arguably have a statutory exemption from certain portions of the federal 
records law that is not reflected in the current U.S. Code.  Part III assesses 
the legal status of the interrogation tapes and argues that the tapes should 
have been considered records and that the CIA’s determination otherwise 
represents, at best, a questionable and highly aggressive interpretation of 
the law.  Part IV argues that the destruction of the interrogation tapes 
should provide the impetus for modest, but crucial, amendments to the 
federal records laws.  The law must ensure that the recordkeeping 
responsibilities of the intelligence community are sufficiently clear and 
transparent, that NARA’s supervisory and enforcement powers are 
sufficiently robust, and that documentation of intelligence operations is 
preserved to serve current and future intelligence needs and to protect the 
rights of both detainees and intelligence officers. 
I.  THE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE TAPES 
The growing public narrative of the creation and destruction of the 
videotapes discloses certain basic facts.17  The CIA began videotaping 
interrogations in April 2002 and stopped in December 2002, at which point 
ninety-two videotapes existed.  The tapes primarily depicted the detention 
and interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, including eighty-three applications of 
“waterboarding.”18  The CIA destroyed the tapes in November 2005. 
The focus of this article is whether there was a baseline legal obligation 
to preserve the tapes as federal records.  As described in detail below, 
publicly available documents indicate that the CIA’s initial guidance was to 
retain the tapes and treat them as records.  By early 2003, however, the CIA 
had determined that the tapes were not records and the CIA’s General 
Counsel had “no objection” to the destruction of the tapes.  This legal 
position left only specific determinations about whether the tapes were 
relevant to ongoing or foreseeable proceedings, such as the 9/11 
Commission deliberations or Guantánamo habeas cases, as potential legal 
 
 17. See generally THE CIA INTERROGATION OF ABU ZUBAYDAH, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/CIA_Interrogation_of_AZ_released_04-15-10.pdf [hereinafter 
CIA Abu Zubaydah Report]; see also American Civil Liberties Union,  Selected Chronology of 
the CIA’s Destruction of 92 Videotapes, http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ 20091124_Chronology_ 
of_Videotapes.pdf; Marcy Wheeler, Torture Timeline, EMPTYWHEEL, http://emptywheel.firedog 
lake.com/timeline-collection/torture-tape-timeline/. 
 18. A few tapes depicted interrogations of a second detainee, Abd al Rahim al Nashiri. 
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obstacles to their destruction.19  In the end, although several administration 
officials and lawyers opposed destruction and “counseled caution,” 
according to Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) Michael 
V. Hayden it nevertheless remained “the agency’s view that there were no 
legal impediments to the tapes’ destruction”20 and therefore the destruction 
was “in line with the law.”21 
A.  The Creation of the Tapes 
In late March 2002, U.S. and Pakistani personnel raided a house in 
Faisalabad, Pakistan, during which Abu Zubaydah was shot twice and taken 
into custody.22  Shortly thereafter the CIA transferred him to a “black site,” 
reportedly in Thailand, for interrogation.23  CIA headquarters “had intense 
interest in keeping abreast of all aspects of Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation” 
and videotaping of his detention began soon after his capture.24 
There were several explanations for the videotaping.  First, the CIA 
wanted to document Abu Zubyadah’s medical condition and his treatment 
to avoid accusations of culpability in the event of his death.25  Early on the 
videotaping was therefore nearly continuous, recording Abu Zubaydah’s 
“every moment: asleep in his cell, having his bandages changed, being 
interrogated.”26  A second reason was to assist in preparing reports of the 
interrogations.  Director Hayden stated that “it was thought the tapes could 
serve as a backstop to guarantee that other methods of documenting the 
interrogations – and the crucial information they produced – were accurate 
 
 19. Although an examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, such 
considerations are also relevant to the federal records laws. See infra Part III.C. 
 20. Joby Warrick & Walter Pincus, Station Chief Made Appeal To Destroy CIA Tapes, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2008, at A1. 
 21. D/CIA 2007 Statement, supra note 1. 
 22. CIA Abu Zubaydah Report, supra note 17; see also Tim McGirk, Anatomy of a 
Raid, TIME, Apr. 8, 2002. 
 23. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 
SECRET DETENTIONS AND ILLEGAL TRANSFERS OF DETAINEES INVOLVING COUNCIL OF  
EUROPE MEMBER STATES: SECOND REPORT ¶70 (2007), http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/ 
WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc11302.pdf (stating that “Thailand hosted the first CIA ‘black site,’ 
and that Abu Zubaydah was held there after his capture”). 
 24. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL REVIEW, 
COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES ¶77 (2004), available at 
http://luxmedia.com.edgesuite.net/aclu/IG_Report.pdf [hereinafter CIA OIG REPORT]. 
 25. See id. (noting that “[o]ne initial purpose was to ensure a record of Abu 
Zubaydah’s medical condition and treatment should he succumb to his wounds and questions 
arise about the medical care provided to him by CIA.”); see also Scott Shane & Mark 
Mazzetti, Tapes by C.I.A. Lived and Died To Save Image, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at A1 
(stating that if Abu Zubaydah were to have “died in American hands” CIA officers “knew 
that much of the world would believe they had killed him”). 
 26. See Shane & Mazzetti, supra note 25. 
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and complete.”27  A senior CIA official at the time later added, “You 
couldn’t have more than one or two analysts in the room.  You want people 
with spectacular language skills to watch the tapes.  You want your top Al 
Qaeda experts to watch the tapes.  You want psychologists to watch the 
tapes.”28  A third reason was to ensure that the use of “enhanced 
interrogation techniques,” including waterboarding, complied with 
applicable legal guidance.  As D/CIA Hayden stated, “this effort was new, 
and the Agency was determined that it proceed in accord with established 
legal and policy guidelines.  So, on its own, CIA began to videotape 
interrogation.”29 
On April 17, 2002, just weeks after Abu Zubaydah was captured, a CIA 
cable to the field mandated that the tapes “should not [repeat] not be taped 
over” and that “[e]ach of the tapes should be collected, logged and labeled, 
and sent to headquarters”30  The next day, April 18, the field responded 
noting that with the “round the clock video taping” the officers on site were 
“quickly building an impressive mound of video tapes” and requested 
clarification about whether it was necessary to retain the tapes.31 
On April 27, 2002, an email between CIA officers asked when “the 
tapes of the interrogations [would] arrive here” and expressly directed that 
the tapes “should all be catalogued and made into official record copies.”32 
A further cable on May 6, 2002, entitled “Guidance on Retention of Video 
Tapes of Abu Zubaydah” again repeated the earlier instructions: “Please do 
not tape over or edit videos of Abu Zubaydah’s interrogations” and “Please 
preserve all videos,” noting that “[t]hough we recognize that the tapes may 
be cumbersome to store, they offer evidence of AZ’s condition/treatment 
 
 27. See D/CIA 2007 Statement, supra note 1; see also Shane & Mazzetti, supra note 
25 (stating that videotaping began because of the “interest in capturing all the information to 
be gleaned from a rare resource”).  The CIA OIG noted, however, that the interrogation team 
advised that the tapes “rarely, if ever, were used for that purpose.”  CIA OIG REPORT, supra 
note 24, at ¶77. 
 28. Shane & Mazzetti, supra note 25 (quoting A. B. Krongard). 
 29. See D/CIA 2007 Statement, supra note 1; see also Shane & Mazzetti, supra note 
25 (stating that “[f]or many years the C.I.A. had rarely conducted even standard 
interrogation, let alone ones involving physical pressure, so officials wanted to track closely 
the use of legally fraught interrogation methods.”); Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Destroyed Tapes 
of Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007 (stating that the videotaping was “ordered as a 
way of assuring ‘quality control’ at remote sites”). 
 30. A redacted copy of the April 17, 2002, cable is available at http://www.dcoxfiles. 
com/judicialwatch/17.pdf [hereinafter April 17, 2002, Cable]. 
 31. A redacted copy of the April 18, 2002 cable is available at http://www.dcoxfiles. 
com/judicialwatch/18.pdf [hereinafter April 18, 2002, Cable]. 
 32. A government index describing the email as “from a CIA officer to another CIA 
officer, with several additional CIA officers and attorneys copied” and a redacted copy of the 
email entitled “AZ Interrogations” is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/27.pdf 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter April 27, 2002 Email]. 
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while in [redacted] care that may be of value in the future (apart from 
actionable intelligence).”33 
B.  Waterboarding, “Security” Risks, and the End of Recording 
From April until August 2002, discussions took place within the 
executive branch about the legality of various interrogation techniques, 
culminating in an August 1, 2002, DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
written memorandum.34  The OLC concluded that, subject to several 
assumptions and conditions, certain interrogation techniques, including 
waterboarding, would not violate the federal anti-torture statute.35 
According to the CIA’s Inspector General, interrogators subsequently 
“applied the waterboard” to Abu Zubaydah at least eighty-three times in 
August 2002.36 
On August 20, 2002, concerns were raised about the retention of the 
videotapes.  CIA officers in the field sent a cable to headquarters entitled 
“Risks of indefinite retention of videotapes” that discussed “the security 
risks of videotape retention” and suggested “new procedures for videotape 
retention and disposal.”37  On September 5, 2002, a meeting of individuals 
from CIA headquarters made the crucial determination that preservation of 
the tapes was “not required by law” and that 
their retention represents a serious security risk for [redacted] 
officers recorded on them, and for all [redacted] officers present 
and participating in [redacted] operations; they also recognized . . . 
the danger to all Americans should the tapes be compromised.  In 
this possible circumstance, there also exists a clear danger that the 
officers pictured on the tapes could be subject to retribution from 
al-Qa’ida elements.38 
 
 33. A redacted copy of the May 6, 2002, cable is available at http://www. 
dcoxfiles.com/judicialwatch/6.pdf [hereinafter May 6, 2002 Cable]. 
 34. A declassified narrative of the history of the OLC memoranda relating to the 
CIA’s detention and interrogation program prepared by Senator John D. Rockefeller is 
available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/olcopinion.pdf. 
 35. See 18 U.S.C. §2340A (2006); Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of 
Legal Counsel to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/olc/docs/memo-bybee2002.pdf. 
 36. CIA OIG REPORT, supra note 24, at ¶223. 
 37. A government index describing the August 20, 2002, cable is available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/20.pdf. 
 38. The Sept. 5, 2002, meeting is described in an Oct. 25, 2002, cable entitled 
“Disposition of Videotapes.”  A government index describing the Oct. 25, 2002, cable and a 
redacted copy of the cable are available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/25.pdf [hereinafter 
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“Accordingly,” a cable to the field later reported, headquarters “determined 
that the best alternative to eliminate those security and additional risks is to 
destroy these tapes.”39 
On October 25, 2002, a cable from headquarters discussed deploying a 
team to assist in “destroying the tapes completely.”40  This cable also 
provided a new policy for the use of tapes: 
Starting immediately, it is now [headquarters’] policy that 
[redacted] record one day’s worth of sessions on one videotape for 
operational considerations, utilize the tape within that same day for 
purposes of review and note taking, and record the next day’s 
sessions on the same tape.  Thus, in effect, the single tape in use 
[redacted] will contain only one day’s worth of interrogation 
sessions.41 
By mid-November 2002, however, CIA headquarters decided to 
conduct a “random independent review” of the tapes prior to their 
destruction.42  Shortly thereafter, the CIA’s Office of General Counsel 
(OGC) dispatched an attorney to review them in order “to ascertain 
compliance with the August 2002 DOJ OLC opinion and compare what 
actually happened with what was reported to Headquarters.”43  Based on the 
review, the attorney “concluded that the cable traffic did in fact accurately 
describe the interrogation methods employed and that the methods 
conformed to the applicable legal and policy guidance.”44  According to 
D/CIA Hayden, the CIA thus “determined that its documentary reporting 
was full and exacting, removing any need for tapes.  Indeed, videotaping 
stopped in 2002.” 
On December 3, 2002, the plan to destroy the remaining tapes 
following the OGC review met an unexpected obstacle.  CIA headquarters 
 
October 25, 2002 Cable]. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; see also Shane & Mazzetti, supra note 25 (stating that according to a CIA 
officer, by “late 2002, interrogators were recycling videotapes, preserving only two days of 
tapes before recording over them”). 
 42. A government index describing a Nov. 15, 2002, email from CIA headquarters to 
the field, “informing field of request to have a random independent review of the videotapes, 
before they are destroyed to ensure accuracy” is available at http://www.dcoxfiles. 
com/aclu/15.pdf. 
 43. CIA OIG REPORT, supra note 24, at ¶77; see also Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, 
Key Omission in Memo To Destroy CIA Terror Tapes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 2010, at 8 
(stating that “CIA lawyer John L. McPherson was assigned to watch the videos and compare 
them with written summaries” and that if “the reports accurately described the videos, that 
would bolster the case that the tapes were unnecessary”). 
 44. CIA Abu Zubaydah Report, supra note 17, at 7; see also CIA OIG REPORT, supra 
note 24, at ¶77 (stating that the attorney “reported that there was no deviation from the DOJ 
guidance or the written record”). 
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exchanged several cables with the field including one entitled “Closing of 
Facility and Destruction of Classified Information” in which headquarters 
stated that officers in the field had made a “mistake” (the details of which 
are redacted) involving moving the tapes.45  Headquarters therefore 
instructed that the tapes were not to be destroyed and that each was to be 
logged in by tape number and date.46  An inventory the same day found 
ninety-two videotapes.47 
C.  Storing the Tapes and Final Destruction 
Throughout December 2002 and January 2003, CIA attorneys 
corresponded repeatedly about the possible destruction of the videotapes, 
including drafting a memorandum on the issue to then Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet.48 The CIA OGC advised that it “had no 
objection to the destruction of the videotapes, but strongly recommended” 
that Congress be “notified about the existence of the tapes and the reasons 
why the Agency has decided to destroy them.”49  Communications within 
the CIA discussed what would make the tapes an “official record.”50  On 
 
 45. A government index describing the Dec. 3, 2002, cable entitled “Closing of facility 
and destruction of classified information” is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/ 
aclu/3.pdf.  A revised government index describing the same cable (in which the title is 
changed and “Closing of facility” is removed) and a redacted copy of the cable is available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/3a.pdf [hereinafter Dec. 3, 2002 Cable].  Press accounts have 
made inconsistent claims regarding the timing of the closing of the field facility, which was 
reportedly in Thailand. Compare Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, CIA Whisked Detainees 
from Gitmo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 6, 2010 (stating that the “jail in Thailand known as 
Cat’s Eye closed in December 2002”), with Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in 
Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1 (stating that the “black site” in Thailand 
was closed in June 2003). 
 46. Dec. 3, 2002 Cable, supra note 45.  Although relevant cables are unavailable or 
redacted, one possible explanation is that the “mistake” could have been moving the tapes 
from the field facility where interrogations were apparently conducted to the CIA station 
reportedly at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, where, according to press accounts, they were 
held later.  See Warrick & Pincus, supra note 20.  Had the tapes remained at the field facility 
when it closed, the CIA might have further justified their destruction as part of an 
“evacuation” of a field facility. 
 47. A redacted cable dated Dec. 9, 2002, and entitled “Eyes Only – Inventory and 
Review of Interrogation Videotapes” includes an inventory of the 92 tapes and is available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/9.pdf. 
 48. A government index describing a memorandum “discussing the disposition of the 
videotapes” from the CIA General Counsel to the D/CIA dated Dec. 20, 2002, is available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/201.pdf. 
 49. CIA Abu Zubaydah Report, supra note 17, at 7. 
 50. For example, a government index describing a memorandum dated Jan. 12, 2003, 
titled “Official Record Question Regarding Tapes,” which discusses “what actions make the 
videotapes an official record,” is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/121.pdf 
[hereinafter Jan. 12, 2003 Memo]. 
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January 28, 2003, DCI Tenet signed new guidelines for future CIA 
interrogations involving “enhanced interrogation techniques” whose final 
provision, titled “Recordkeeping,” required only a written record.51 
In January and February 2003 the decision to destroy the tapes was 
made more complex by two additional factors.  First was the initiation by 
the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) of a “special review” of CIA 
detention operations, which would include an additional review of the 
interrogation tapes.52  Second were the first reactions of government 
officials outside the CIA to the existence of the tapes and the CIA’s plans to 
destroy them.  In early February 2003, for example, the CIA discussed the 
tapes with Representative Jane Harman, who revealed in a subsequent letter 
that the CIA had disclosed that 
there is videotape of Abu Zubaydah following his capture that will 
be destroyed after the Inspector General finishes his inquiry.  I 
would urge the Agency to reconsider that plan.  Even if the 
videotape does not constitute an official record that must be 
preserved under the law, the videotape would be the best proof that 
the written record is accurate, if such record is called into question 
in the future.  The fact of destruction would reflect badly on the 
Agency.53 
In September 2003, a memorandum within CIA headquarters discussed 
“the possible legality of a proposal to destroy the tapes.”54  In January 2004, 
a draft of the CIA OIG’s “special review” was available within CIA 
headquarters.55  In February 2004, an email was circulated “concerning the 
legalities as to whether the CIA is legally required to retain the 
videotapes.”56  On April 12, 2004, an email within CIA entitled “Handling 
 
 51. CIA OIG REPORT, supra note 24, at App. E, ¶5. The guidelines provided that for 
interrogations in which “enhanced interrogation techniques” are used “a contemporaneous 
record shall be created setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique 
employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters 
approval cable.” Id. 
 52. See generally Decl. of Constance E. Rea, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for 
Investigations, Office of Inspector General, CIA, ACLU v. Dep’t of Def.  (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 
2008) (No. 04-4151) (describing the CIA OIG’s review) [hereinafter Rea Declaration]. 
 53. Letter from Representative Jane Harman to Scott Muller, General Counsel, Central 
Intelligence Agency (Feb. 10, 2003) (emphasis added), available at http://www.house. 
gov/apps/list/press/ca36_harman/harmanletter.pdf. 
 54. A government index describing the memorandum dated September 12, 2003, is 
available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/126.pdf. 
 55. A government index describing a 170-page draft of the review from January 2004 
is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/127.pdf. 
 56. A government index describing the email dated February 19, 2004, discussing 
“whether the CIA is legally required to retain the videotapes” is available at http://www. 
dcoxfiles. com/aclu/19.pdf. 
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of Tapes” again “discussed what actions would make tapes an official 
record.”57 
On May 7, 2004, the CIA OIG issued the final version of the “special 
review,” which found, based on a review of the tapes and in contrast to the 
conclusion of the earlier review by a CIA OGC attorney, that “the 
waterboard technique employed at [redacted] was different from the 
technique as described in the [August 2002] DOJ opinion.”58  In mid-May 
2004, in a meeting at the White House, the disposition of the tapes was 
discussed in light of the then-recent public release of pictures depicting 
mistreatment at Abu Ghraib.59  According to a CIA timeline, Vice President 
Cheney’s legal counsel David Addington and White House counsel Alberto 
Gonzales told the CIA not to destroy the tapes.60  Subsequently additional 
officials, including John Negroponte, in the newly created position of 
Director of National Intelligence, also advised against the destruction of the 
tapes.61 
In late October 2005, emails within CIA headquarters discussed the 
possible relocation or destruction of the videotapes, as well as the possible 
public acknowledgment of the CIA’s interrogation program.62  At the time, 
the tapes were reportedly held in the safe of the CIA station chief in 
Thailand.63  According to press accounts, the head of the CIA’s Directorate 
 
 57. A government index describing the email dated April 12, 2004, is available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/12.pdf [hereinafter April 12, 2004 Email]. 
 58. CIA OIG REPORT, supra note 24, at ¶79. 
 59. Apuzzo & Goldman, supra note 43.  The Abu Ghraib pictures appeared publicly 
for the first time in late April 2004.  See Rebecca Leung, Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs 
Probed, 60 MINUTES II, Apr. 28, 2004 (noting an Army investigation into detainee abuses 
and stating that “for the first time, 60 Minutes II will show some of the pictures”), available 
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml. 
 60. See “Timeline Regarding Destruction of Abu Zubaydah Videotapes,” available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/160.pdf. 
 61. See id. (indicating in November 2005 that the Director of National Intelligence “as 
recently as a few months ago opposed the idea of destroying the tapes”); see also Warrick & 
Pincus, supra note 20 (stating that those “known to have counseled against the tapes’ 
destruction” included John B. Bellinger III, Harriet E. Miers, George J. Tenet, and Scott 
Muller “while serving as the CIA’s general counsel”). 
 62. A government index describing an October 28, 2005, email entitled “Authorization 
to destroy tapes” concerning “whether to send a cable to destroy or relocate videotapes” is 
available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/54.pdf.  A government index describing an 
October 31, 2005, email entitled “Potential Press Briefing” discussing whether to “publically 
acknowledge counterterrorism interrogation program” is available at http://www.dcoxfiles. 
com/aclu/56.pdf. Such discussions may have resulted from knowledge of an impending 
Washington Post article by Dana Priest, published on November 2, 2005, that alleged the 
existence of CIA “black sites,” including one reportedly in Thailand.  Priest, supra note 45. 
 63. Apuzzo & Goldman, supra note 43. 
04_COX V17 FINAL (6-14-11).DOC  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/2011  12:10 PM 
142 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY  [Vol. 5:131 
of Operations asked a CIA attorney “whether there was any legal 
requirement to keep the tapes” and reportedly was told that there was not.64 
Finally, on November 8, 2005, a CIA cable from the field requested 
final permission to destroy the tapes, citing “the fact that the Inspector 
General had advised . . . that [the] video tapes, were no longer required for 
his investigation and the determination by the Office of General Counsel 
that the [redacted] cable traffic accurately documented [redacted] activities 
recorded on video tape.”65  On the same day, a cable in response approved 
the destruction of the tapes “for the reasons cited” in the request, namely 
“there is no legal or OIG requirement to continue to retain the tapes.”66  On 
November 9, 2005, a final cable confirmed that the videotapes had been 
destroyed, noting that “[d]estruction activity was initiated at 0910 HRS and 
completed at 1230 HRS.”67 
II.  THE CIA AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL RECORDS 
The federal records laws create an integrated legal framework 
governing the creation, use, and destruction of federal records.  The outline 
below briefly describes that framework, discusses significant exceptions for 
government documents known as “nonrecords” and “working files,” and 
explores the application of these standards to the CIA, including possible 
statutory exceptions unique to the CIA. 
A.  The Legal Framework for Federal Records 
Although the laws governing federal records are commonly referred to 
collectively as the “Federal Records Act,”68 relevant statutory provisions 
derive from a number of different laws, including the Records Disposal Act 
of 1943,69 the Federal Records Act of 1950,70 and the Federal Records 
Management Amendments of 1976.71  The interaction between the various 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. A redacted copy of the Nov. 8, 2005, cable entitled “Request Approval to Destroy 
[Redacted] Videotapes” which requests approval to “follow through” on “original authority 
to destroy” the videotapes is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/81.pdf. 
 66. A redacted copy of the Nov. 8, 2005, cable entitled “DDO Approval to Destroy 
[Redacted] Videotapes” from DDO is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/82.pdf. 
 67. A redacted copy of the Nov. 9, 2005, cable entitled “Destruction of [Redacted] 
Videotapes” stating that all ninety-two videotapes were destroyed is available at http://www. 
dcoxfiles.com/aclu/91.pdf. 
 68. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 346 n.2 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 69. Records Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 78-115, 57 Stat. 380 (1943) (codified as 
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§3301-3314 (2006)). 
 70. Federal Records Act, Pub. L. No. 81-754, § 6, 64 Stat. 578 (1950) (codified as 
amended at chapters 21, 25, 27, 29 and 31 of Title 44). 
 71. Federal Records Management Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-575, 90 Stat. 2724 
(1976) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§2901-2907 (2006)). 
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provisions in these different laws and their differing legislative histories can 
make deciphering the “purpose” of the federal records laws difficult.72  The 
two primary, relevant, and sometimes contradictory, purposes, however, are 
(1) governmental efficiency and (2) the preservation of the documentary 
history of the government.73 
The federal records laws increase governmental efficiency in 
controlling the exponential growth in government documents by providing 
procedures for their management and disposal.  This purpose is evidenced 
in the express statutory goals of controlling the “quantity and quality” of 
government records as well as the “[j]udicious preservation and disposal of 
records.”74  The federal records laws also aim to preserve the historical 
record by requiring assessments of the “research” value of government 
records by both the agencies that create them and the Archivist of the 
United States (the “Archivist”) prior to their destruction.75  Such 
requirements serve the statutory goal of preserving “[a]ccurate and 
complete documentation” of the “policies and transactions” of the federal 
government.76 
Together, the federal records laws create an integrated framework 
governing the “life cycle” of agency records from their initial creation 
through their maintenance and use to their ultimate “disposition,” a term 
which includes both of the opposite fates of destruction or transfer to the 
National Archives for permanent preservation.77  These laws also establish 
the respective roles and responsibilities of federal agencies, the Archivist, 
and NARA in the creation and destruction of records. 
 
 72. See James D. Lewis, Note, White House Electronic Mail and Federal 
Recordkeeping Law: Press “D” To Delete History, 93 MICH. L. REV. 794, 802 (1995) 
(noting the “piecemeal enactment of the various provisions” of the federal records laws and 
their “fragmented” legislative history). 
 73. See Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1285 & 1287 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (citing “Congress’ evident concern with preserving a complete record of 
government activity for historical and other uses” but also noting “Congress’ oft-expressed 
intent to balance complete documentation with efficient, streamlined recordkeeping”) 
(emphasis in original); see also Lewis, supra note 72, at 802 (noting the “two basic yet 
potentially contradictory” purposes of the federal records laws).  The Senate report for the 
Federal Records Act of 1950 notes that “[i]t is well to emphasize that records come into 
existence, or should do so, not in order to . . . satisfy the archival needs of this and future 
generations, but first of all to serve the administrative and executive purposes of the 
organization that creates them.” S. REP. NO. 81-2140 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3547, 3550.  Cf. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 149 
(1980) (citing the 1950 Senate Report and stating that the legislative history “reveals that 
their purpose was not to benefit private parties, but solely to benefit the agencies themselves 
and the Federal Government as a whole”). 
 74. 44 U.S.C. §2902 (2006). 
 75. 44 U.S.C. §§3303-3303a (2006). 
 76. 44 U.S.C. §2902 (2006). 
 77. See 44 U.S.C. §2901(5) (2006) (defining “records disposition”). 
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First, federal agencies are obligated to create records.  The law 
mandates that agencies “make and preserve records containing adequate 
and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, 
decisions, procedures and essential transactions of the agency.”78  While this 
requirement provides agencies with discretion in determining what records 
are necessary to provide “adequate and proper documentation,” the same 
provision requires that such records be designed to “furnish the information 
necessary to protect the legal and financial rights of the Government and of 
persons directly affected by the agency’s activities.”79 
Second, federal agencies must maintain and protect records by 
establishing “safeguards against the removal or loss of records” and by 
educating agency employees about recordkeeping responsibilities, including 
the requirement that agency records may not be “alienated or destroyed” 
except in compliance with the federal records laws.80  The law places an 
affirmative duty on the agency head to “notify the Archivist of any actual, 
impending, or threatened unlawful removal . . . or destruction of records” 
within the agency and, with the assistance of the Archivist, to “initiate 
action through the Attorney General” for either the recovery of the records 
or “other redress within a reasonable period of time.”81  If the head of the 
Agency fails to make this notification, the Archivist can unilaterally request 
action by the Attorney General and “shall notify the Congress when such a 
request has been made.”82 
Third, agencies must dispose of the records they create, whether that 
disposition is destruction or eventual transfer to the National Archives, in 
accordance with the exclusive procedures provided by the federal records 
laws.83  Agencies make initial determinations about whether the categories 
 
 78. 44 U.S.C. §3101 (2006). 
 79. Id. The Archivist is tasked with providing “guidance and assistance” to agencies 
“with respect to ensuring adequate and proper documentation.” 44 U.S.C. §2904(a) (2006). 
 80. 44 U.S.C. §3105 (2006). 
 81. 44 U.S.C. §3106 (2006). 
 82. Id. An example of actual agency practice in the event of destroyed or missing 
records is illustrated by correspondence between NARA and the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/padilla.pdf, regarding a 
missing videotaped interrogation of Jose Padilla. In 2007, after Padilla had been charged 
criminally, the government disclosed to the court that the DIA was not able to locate a DVD 
of a specific interrogation.  The DIA did not, however, notify the Archivist. Instead, based 
on news reports of the case, NARA wrote the DIA regarding the video, stating that there “is 
currently no approved schedule that covers this series of records” and therefore a 
“disposition action is not authorized.”  The DIA reported back to NARA that DIA officials 
had “diligently searched all files” in order “to locate the DVD or its contents, to no avail” 
and advised that DIA officials were “using more rigorous control procedures to detail 
transfer of record custody” in order to “avoid accidental record disposal or destruction in the 
future.”  NARA, satisfied with this response and DIA’s “corrective actions,” “close[d] out” 
its “examination of this matter” and did not refer the matter to the Attorney General. 
 83. See 44 U.S.C. §3314 (2006) (stating that the statutory procedures “are exclusive, 
and records of the United States Government may not be alienated or destroyed except under 
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of records they create should, based on an assessment of their likely value, 
be temporary or permanent.84  Agencies then submit proposed lists or 
“schedules” describing categories or series of agency records to the 
Archivist with proposals for their disposition.  Categories of records 
proposed for destruction should consist of records that “do not appear to 
have sufficient administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant 
their further preservation by the Government” when they are no longer 
“needed by [the agency] in the transaction of its current business.”85 
The Archivist examines the proposed schedules and independently 
evaluates whether the categories of records listed for eventual destruction 
“do not, or will not after the lapse of the period specified, have sufficient 
administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant their continued 
preservation by the Government.”86  Upon making such a determination, the 
Archivist “empower[s] the agency to dispose of those records” in 
accordance with the schedule.87  The Archivist may also “accept for 
deposit,” and in some circumstances “direct and effect the transfer of” 
records the Archivist determines to “have sufficient historical or other value 
to warrant their continued preservation by the United States Government.”88 
Finally, the federal records laws contain two provisions that authorize 
the destruction of records in exigent circumstances.  First, if the Archivist 
and the head of an agency jointly determine that records constitute a 
“menace to human health or life or property, the Archivist shall eliminate 
 
this chapter”); see also Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1278 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (stating the federal records laws prescribe “the exclusive mechanism for disposal 
of federal records”). 
 84. See NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL RECORDS: A 
RECORDS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 12 (1997) (describing temporary and permanent 
records) [hereinafter NARA DISPOSITION HANDBOOK]. 
 85. 44 U.S.C. §3303 (2006).  An agency records schedule might propose, for example, 
that contracts between the agency and outside contractors are temporary records that should 
be retained, for instance, for 7 years and then destroyed. Such a schedule might propose that 
correspondence between the head of the agency and members of Congress, in contrast, 
should be permanent records that will be transferred to the National Archives after a 
specified period. A number of records schedules approved by the Archivist are available at 
http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/. 
 86. 44 U.S.C. §3303a(a) (2006). 
 87. 44 U.S.C. §3303a(a)(2) (2006).  The Archivist also promulgates generic records 
schedules that apply to all agencies covering the disposal of common and routine records. 44 
U.S.C. §3303a(d) (2006). 
 88. 44 U.S.C. §2107 (2006).  Despite a widespread public belief that the government 
is preserving a sizable portion of federal records for history, less than 3% of federal records 
are permanently preserved.  See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-742, 
FEDERAL RECORDS: NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND SELECTED AGENCIES NEED TO STRENGTHEN E-
MAIL MANAGEMENT 6 (2008) (“Of the total number of federal records, less than 3 percent are 
designated permanent”). 
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the menace immediately by any method he considers necessary.”89  Second, 
the head of an agency can authorize the emergency destruction of records 
located outside the United States “[d]uring a state of war between the 
United States and another nation, or when hostile action by a foreign power 
appears imminent” if the retention of the records “would be prejudicial to 
the interests of the United States.”90 
B.  Nonrecords and Working Files 
The integrated legal framework governing federal records from birth to 
final disposition, however, is marked by two sizable asterisks based on the 
concepts of “nonrecords” and “working files.” 
First, not all government documents are “records.” Documents created 
by government agencies can also be “nonrecords” that can be destroyed 
without the Archivist’s approval or even the Archivist’s awareness that the 
documents ever existed.91  The concept of nonrecords arose out of the 
Records Disposal Act of 1943, which provided the definition of “records” 
and in which Congress wanted to “make it clear that [federal agencies] are 
not obligated to consider every scrap of paper on which writing or printing 
appears as a record.”92  “Nonrecords,” therefore, are government documents 
that either fail to satisfy the definition of “records” or which fall within one 
of three categories of statutory exceptions.93 
Federal law defines “records” broadly as including 
all books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, 
or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United States 
Government under Federal law or in connection with the 
transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for 
preservation by that agency . . . as evidence of the organization, 
 
 89. 44 U.S.C. §3310 (2006). 
 90. 44 U.S.C. §3311 (2006).   The agency official who directed such destruction “shall 
submit a written report to the Archivist” describing the circumstances of the destruction 
within six months.  Id. 
 91. NARA DISPOSITION HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 26.  A third category not 
relevant for purposes of this article is personal papers.  For a discussion of the distinction 
between personal papers and agency records see, for example, Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. 
Dep’t of Agric., 455 F.3d 283, 287-293 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (determining whether appointment 
calendars of agency officials were personal papers or agency records). 
 92. H.R. REPORT NO. 78-559 (1943), reprinted in 1943 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2-140, 2-141;  
see  also  NAT’L  ARCHIVES  AND  RECORDS ADMIN., NARA  AND  FEDERAL  RECORDS:   LAWS 
AND AUTHORITIES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 6 (1988) [hereinafter NARA TASK FORCE]. 
 93. See NARA DISPOSITION HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 26 (defining “nonrecords” 
as “US Government-owned documentary materials excluded from the legal definition of 
records . . . either by failing to meet the general conditions of record status . . . or by falling 
under one of three specific categories”). 
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functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other 
activities of the Government or because of the informational value 
of data in them.94 
The three statutory exceptions to the definition of “records” are (1) 
“[l]ibrary and museum material made or acquired and preserved solely for 
reference or exhibition purposes,” (2) “extra copies of documents preserved 
only for convenience of reference,” and (3) “stocks of publications and 
stocks of processed documents.”95 
The ambiguous concept of “nonrecords” invites both confusion and 
mischief.  A NARA Task Force in 1988 noted, for example, that following 
the passage of the FOIA, which applies to agency “records,” some agencies 
began classifying more documents as “nonrecords” to avoid FOIA 
disclosure requirements.96  NARA’s handbook on records disposition 
further warns that if the responsibility for determining record status is given 
“to officials at agency staff or operating levels” it “may lead to misuse of 
the nonrecord label, weaken the entire disposition program, and result in the 
loss of valuable records.”97  NARA, therefore, advises that “only the records 
officer should determine record or nonrecord status, after obtaining any 
necessary advice from the agency’s legal counsel.”98 
Second is the concept of “working files,” “working papers,” or drafts.99 
The value of such documents, and whether they constitute records, depends 
on whether they provide additional information not in the “final” version or 
 
 94. 44 U.S.C. §3301 (2006). 
 95. Id.  NARA provides some additional possible examples of “nonrecord material” 
such as “[i]nformation copies of correspondence, directives, forms, and other documents on 
which no administrative actions is recorded or taken,” “[r]outing slips and transmittal sheets 
adding no information to that contained in the transmitted material,” “[t]ickler, follow up, or 
suspense copies of correspondence, provided they are extra copies of the originals,” 
“[d]uplicate copies of documents maintained in the same file,” “[e]xtra copies of printed or 
processed materials for which complete record sets exist,” and “[p]hysical exhibits, artifacts, 
and other material objects lacking evidential value.” NARA DISPOSITION HANDBOOK, supra 
note 84, at 24-25. 
 96. NARA TASK FORCE, supra note 92, at 6; Cf. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. 
Webster, 720 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that NARA “acquiesced in . . . FBI measures 
to escape the burdens of the Freedom of Information Act by disposing of some of its files” 
and that “it is clear that the FOIA influenced the drafting of the 1977 schedule and reflected 
an [impermissible] bias . . . in favor of the destruction . . . of governmental records.”). 
 97. NARA DISPOSITION HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 26. 
 98. Id.  Further, NARA notes that the agency records officer “should seek NARA’s 
guidance” regarding the status of “a questionable file or type of document” and advises that 
“[w]hen it is difficult to decide whether certain files are records or nonrecord materials, the 
records officer should treat them as records.”  Id. 
 99. See generally Philip G. Schrag, Working Papers as Federal Records: The Need for 
New Legislation To Preserve the History of National Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 95 (1994). 
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help explain the creation of the final product.100  NARA regulations 
specifically provide that 
working files such as preliminary drafts and rough notes . . . are 
records that must be maintained for purposes of adequate and 
proper documentation if . . . they were circulated or made available 
to employees, other than the creator, for official purposes . . . and 
[t]hey contain unique information . . . that adds to a proper 
understanding of the agency’s . . . execution of . . . actions, or 
responsibilities.101 
Applying the concept of “working files,” however, is difficult and can 
have significant consequences.102  NARA notes, for example, that the 
destruction of drafts and working files has at times “left agencies unable to 
justify controversial decisions because they no longer have documentation 
of proposals and evaluations of alternatives.”103  Moreover, the problem of 
“working files” is particularly acute in the context of intelligence 
operations, in which the term “working papers” has traditionally been used 
to refer to documents that not only do not need to be preserved, but that 
must be destroyed when they are no longer needed as a part of a larger 
information security strategy to keep the amount of classified material to a 
minimum.104 
C.  CIA Exemptions, Statutory Duties, and Schedules 
The current provisions of the federal records laws contain no explicit 
exemptions for the CIA from their coverage.  The history of those laws, 
 
 100. NARA guidance provides limited help, noting that “[n]ormally case working files 
are records because they generally need to be organized and maintained for some specified 
period of time” and that other “likely record categories include working files used in 
preparing reports or studies and preliminary drafts of policy documents circulated for 
comment.”  NARA DISPOSITION HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 24. 
 101. 36 C.F.R. §1222.12(c) (2011). 
 102. See NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., AGENCY RECORDKEEPING 
REQUIREMENTS:  A  MANAGEMENT  GUIDE  (1995) (noting that “[o]ne of the problem areas  in 
distinguishing records from nonrecord materials is determining the status of drafts and other 
working papers”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., DOD 5200.1-R, INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM §6-101 
(1997) (defining “working papers” as “documents and material accumulated or created in the 
preparation of finished documents and material” and mandating that “working papers 
containing classified information shall be . . . [d]estroyed when no longer needed”) 
[hereinafter DOD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM].  The issuance also mandates 
emergency planning “for the protection, removal, or destruction of classified material in case 
of . . . terrorist activities, or enemy action, to minimize the risk of its compromise” and that 
such plans should consider “[r]eduction of the amount of classified material on hand.”   Id. at 
§6-303(a) and (c). 
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however, and the laws governing the CIA raise the possibility of certain 
exemptions unique to the CIA.105  Whether the CIA’s internal legal analysis 
of the interrogation tapes relied upon such exceptions remains unknown.  
Acknowledging the potential for such exceptions, however, is crucial to a 
thorough examination of the legal status of the tapes. 
1.  A CIA Exemption to the Federal Records Act of 1950? 
Current statutory provisions that derive ultimately from the 1950 
Federal Records Act include the basic legal obligation of agencies to create 
and preserve “adequate and proper documentation” of agency actions 
(designed to protect the legal rights of “the Government and of persons 
directly affected by the agency’s activities”), the obligation to notify the 
Archivist of unlawful destruction, and the obligation to transfer records to 
the National Archives when directed by the Archivist to do so.106  The 
application of such provisions to the CIA is potentially undermined, 
however, by a limited exemption to which the Federal Records Act was 
initially subject, but which, through various amendments, repeals and 
redrafts over the past sixty years, has disappeared from the U.S. Code.  
There remains, however, a legal argument, at least colorable and possibly 
compelling, that the exemption is still in force.  The details of this 
complicated history are outlined below. 
The Federal Records Act of 1950 was not a standalone piece of 
legislation, but was rather an amendment to the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPAS).107  The FPAS established the 
General Services Administration and generally dealt with “procurement, 
utilization, and disposal of Government property.”108  The declared intent of 
the FPAS was to provide the Government with “an economical and efficient 
system” for, among other things, “records management.”109  The FPAS, 
however, contained a “saving provision” which stated that “[n]othing in this 
Act shall impair or affect the authority of” a number of specific entities 
including “the Central Intelligence Agency.”110 
 
 105. The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-
253, 61 Stat. 495, and its powers and obligations were supplemented by the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-110, 63 Stat. 208. 
 106. 44 U.S.C. §§3101, 3106 (2006). 
 107. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-288, 63 
Stat. 377. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at §2, 63 Stat. 378.  In particular, the FPAS transferred the authority of the 
National Archives to the General Services Administration, and authorized the Administrator 
to “make surveys of Government records and records management and disposal practices 
and obtain reports thereon from Federal agencies.”  Id. at §104, 63 Stat 381. 
 110. Id. at §502(d)(17), 63 Stat 403. 
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A year later in 1950, Congress amended the FPAS by adding the 
Federal Records Act, which established a more detailed legal structure for 
the management of federal records.111  The 1950 Amendment made certain 
modifications to the “saving provision” but the limited exemption for the 
CIA remained.112 
The records management provisions of the Federal Records Act were 
initially codified at Chapter 11 of Title 44 of the U.S. Code.  The exemption 
contained in the “saving provision,” however, was codified in Title 40, 
which governs government property.  Early versions of the U.S. Code 
included cross-references in Title 40 and Title 44 to establish the 
relationship between the separated provisions.  In the 1958 edition of the 
U.S. Code, for example, the exemption, which was codified at 40 U.S.C. 
§474, contains a cross-reference noting that “nothing in . . . Chapter 11 of 
Title 44” (where the Federal Records Act provisions were codified) would 
impair or affect the CIA.113 
In 1968, however, Congress passed legislation to enact Title 44 of the 
U.S. Code into positive law that technically repealed the Federal Records 
Act portions of the FPAS and spread the newly drafted provisions that were 
based on the Federal Records Act throughout Title 44.114  The 1968 
legislation was part of a larger plan of “positive law codification,” still 
ongoing, to restate and reorganize the U.S. Code.115  The Senate Report to 
the 1968 legislation stated unequivocally that the “purpose of this bill is to 
restate in comprehensive form, without substantive change, the statutes in 
effect . . . relating to public printing and documents.”116  However, Title 40, 
where the exemption had been codified, was not similarly enacted into 
positive law at the same time.  As a result of the 1968 amendments, 
therefore, the language in the exemption in Title 40 that cross referenced 
Title 44 was changed to state more generally that nothing in the “act” would 
“impair or affect” the CIA.117  In turn, the codification indicated in a note 
that “act” referred to the FPAS and, while noting that the Federal Records 
 
 111. Federal Records Act, Pub. L. No. 81-754, §6, 64 Stat. 578 (1950). 
 112. Id. at §6, 64 Stat. 583. 
 113. 40 U.S.C. §474 (1958). 
 114. Public Printing and Documents Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-620, 82 Stat. 1238. 
The repeal is found at 82 Stat. 1309, which repeals section 6(d) of the Federal Records Act. 
 115. For a description of the process of positive law codification see Offices of Law 
Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, Codification Legislation, at 
http://uscode.house.gov/codification/legislation.shtml. 
 116. S. REP. NO. 90-1621 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4438, 4438-39 
(emphasis added).  The report further noted that “[i]t is sometimes feared that mere changes 
in terminology and style will result in changes in substance” and that such “fear might have 
weight” for “usual” legislation “where it can be inferred that a change of language is 
intended to change substance” but that “[i]n a codification statute, however, the courts 
uphold the contrary presumption: the statute is intended to remain substantively unchanged.” 
Id. at 4440. 
 117. 40 U.S.C. §474 (1976). 
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Act had been repealed, stated that its subject matter was “now covered by 
chapters 21, 25, 27, 29 and 31 of Title 44.”118 
Whether the 1968 technical repeal of the Federal Records Act in 
enacting Title 44 into positive law had any effect on the continued viability 
of the exemption is arguable, although the position of the CIA was clearly 
that it had none.  In 1977, the General Counsel of the CIA responded to an 
inquiry from Congresswoman Bella Abzug “as to whether the Federal 
Records Act applies to the Central Intelligence Agency.”119  The CIA’s 
response asserted that the “proviso” in the FPAS, as amended by the 
Federal Records Act, that “nothing therein ‘shall impair or affect any 
authority of . . . [the] Central Intelligence Agency’ . . . remains in force and 
therefore represents a continuing and valid limitation on the applicability of 
the Federal Records Act to the CIA.”120  The letter did not mention the 
repeal of the Federal Records Act, noting only that its provisions, “as 
amended, now appear as Chapters 21, 25, 27, 29 and 31 of Title 44 of the 
U.S. Code.”121 
The state of these provisions remained largely unchanged until 2002, 
when Title 40 of the U.S. Code was itself enacted into positive law.122 
Congress again stated that the purpose of the 2002 law was “to revise, 
codify, and enact without substantive change the general and permanent 
laws of the United States related to public buildings, property, and works, 
as title 40, United States Code.”123  The “exemption” provision of the FPAS, 
however, was technically repealed.124  The revised, substitute language 
states “nothing in this subtitle impairs or affects the authority of . . . the 
Central Intelligence Agency.”125  In turn, “subtitle” is defined to mean only 
the immediate subtitle within Title 40 related to federal property and certain 
provisions of the FPAS unrelated to records management.126 
Despite the fact, therefore, that the U.S. Code no longer contains any 
indication that there may exist an exemption for the CIA to provisions 
based on the Federal Records Act of 1950, the CIA could argue that this is 
an unintended omission and that, given the express congressional intent that 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Letter from Anthony A. Lapham, General Counsel, CIA, to Bella S. Abzug, 
Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Government Information & Individual Rights, Committee 
on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 3, 1977), available at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000724993/DOC_0000724993.pdf [hereinafter CIA 
General Counsel Letter]. 
 120. Id. at 1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Pub. L. 107-217, 116 Stat. 1062. 
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 107-479 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 827, 827. 
 124. Pub. L. 107-217, 116 Stat. 1062, 1313 (repealing Section 602(d) of the FPAS). 
 125. 40 U.S.C. §113(e)(16) (2006). 
 126. 40 U.S.C. §111 (2006). 
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neither the 1968 nor the 2002 legislation substantively changed the law, 
such an exemption still exists. 
Even if this exemption survives, however, it is limited.  The legislative 
history of the FPAS indicates that Congress intended the exemption to be a 
narrow one.  The House Report on the original FPAS stated that “[i]t is not 
intended by these exemptions that those administering the agencies or 
programs listed shall be free from all obligation to comply with the 
provisions of the act.”127  The Report further stated that “[i]n other words, to 
the extent that compliance with the act . . . will not so ‘impair or affect the 
authority’ of the several agencies to which the subsection applies as to 
interfere with the operations of their programs, the act will govern.”128 
Further, to the extent the exemption survives, it arguably only applies to 
those provisions that are based on the original Federal Records Act of 1950.  
Most notably, the provisions defining “records” and those relating to the 
disposal of federal records come not from the Federal Records Act of 1950 
but from the Records Disposal Act of 1943.129  Such provisions were never 
subject to the exemption contained within the Federal Records Act, a fact 
the CIA has acknowledged.130  Given the later passage of the Federal 
Records Act of 1950, however, the fact that it mandates the basic duty of 
agencies to “make and preserve” records, and the interrelated nature of the 
federal records laws, the CIA could potentially argue that a legal obligation 
to preserve videotapes depicting covert CIA officers is just the type of 
obligation that might “impair or affect” CIA operations abroad and just the 
type of situation for which the limited congressional exemption was 
intended. 
2.  CIA Statutory Duties 
An additional source of potential exemptions from the requirements of 
the federal records laws is found in the basic statutory duties of the CIA 
derived from the National Security Act of 1947 creating the CIA, and the 
 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 81-670 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1475, 1504. 
 128. Id.  The CIA General Counsel accepted that the exemption was limited in his 1977 
letter stating, “[w]e do not understand or consider that the proviso totally exempts the CIA 
from the requirements of the Federal Records Act, but only that the Agency is not bound by 
those requirements to the limited extent that they may be in conflict with the Agency’s basic 
authorities and missions.”  CIA General Counsel Letter, supra note 119, at 1. 
 129. Records Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 78-115, 57 Stat. 380 (1943) (codified as 
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§3301-3314 (2006)).  Additional relevant provisions were added by 
the Federal Records Management Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-575, 90 Stat. 2723 
(1976). 
 130. See CIA General Counsel Letter, supra note 119, at 1 (stating that the “matter of 
the disposal and destruction of Government records is governed not by the Federal Records 
Act but rather by those provisions of Chapter 33 of Title 44 of the U.S. Code.  Those 
provisions apply broadly to all executive agencies, including CIA”). 
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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.131  The CIA has asserted that 
certain responsibilities contained within these laws should trump other 
statutory duties, including those relating to federal records.  In his 1977 
letter to Congress, for example, the CIA General Counsel stated that, in the 
view of the CIA, the laws governing the destruction of federal records “can 
and should be administered in a manner that is compatible with” the 
obligations under the National Security Act of 1947 that require protection 
of “intelligence sources and methods against unauthorized disclosure” as 
well as provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Act that exempt the 
Agency from “any other law” that would require “the publication or 
disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or 
numbers of personnel employed by the agency.”132 
3.  CIA Records Management and Records Schedules 
Despite such possible exemptions, the CIA administers an active 
records management program that largely functions like similar programs in 
other federal agencies and includes over 120 records schedules approved by 
the Archivist.133  The 2000 NARA evaluation report, part of a multi-year 
evaluation of CIA records management practices, found that the CIA had 
“many elements of a good records management program” including “formal 
recordkeeping requirements and guidance” and stated that the “agency’s 
major intelligence gathering and dissemination operations appear to be 
documented adequately.”134  NARA also found, however, that the CIA’s 
recordkeeping program had “serious shortcomings that must be rectified to 
ensure the agency’s compliance with federal records management laws and 
regulations.”135 
Records management at the CIA does present unique issues related to 
the sensitivity of its mission, and the CIA has previously invoked the 
exemptions described above.  In 1985, for example, in a dispute over a 
 
 131. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as 
amended beginning at 50 U.S.C. §401 (2006)); Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 
Pub. L. No. 81-110, 63 Stat. 208 (codified as amended beginning at 50 U.S.C. §403a 
(2006)). 
 132. CIA General Counsel Letter, supra note 119, at 1-2; see also 50 U.S.C. §§403-1(i), 
403g (2006). 
 133. NARA EVALUATION, supra note 14, at 19. 
 134. Id. at 1. 
 135. These shortcomings included the need for disposition schedules to cover electronic 
systems that include “such key records as finished intelligence products and records relating 
to covert operations and intelligence assets” for which there is “a serious risk” that, without 
approved schedules, “information of great value will not be preserved.”  Id. at 1-2. NARA 
also found that the CIA had not issued sufficient guidance to address “nontextual records,” 
including videotapes.  Id. at 2; see also infra notes 144-145 and accompanying text. 
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proposed records schedule covering broad categories of CIA records, 
NARA objected to language proposed by the CIA that stated vaguely that 
the CIA would eventually transfer its older records to NARA “when 
national security considerations permit.”136  The CIA justified its position by 
stressing that “the need to protect names, sources and methods was 
paramount” and also expressly “cited the fact that the [CIA] was exempt 
from provisions of the Federal Records Act, with which it was complying 
voluntarily.”137 
CIA records schedules approved by the Archivist also include 
schedules covering the highly sensitive operational files of the Directorate 
of Operations (DO) (now known as the National Clandestine Service), the 
category most likely relevant for the interrogation tapes.138  When the CIA 
sought approval for the DO records schedule in 1988, it provided the 
Archivist only with a skeletal version of the schedule classified 
“Confidential”139 and only allowed a NARA archivist to review on-site the 
full text of the schedule, as well as criteria classified “secret” that the CIA 
was using to decide whether certain categories of its operational records 
were chosen for permanent preservation.140  At one point, NARA threatened 
to refuse to approve the DO schedule and to mandate that all such records 
 
 136. Memorandum from Robert W. Krauskopf, NARA, to Garry D. Ryan, NARA, at 2 
(Mar. 5, 1985), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/852.pdf [hereinafter Krauskopf 
Memo].  The dispute was over Records Schedule NC1-263-85-1, which NARA described in 
its 2000 review as an “agency-wide schedule” that “standardized the disposition instructions 
throughout the agency for many key ‘generic’ series that all or most agency components 
accumulate.”  NARA EVALUATION, supra note 14, at 19. This schedule was recently 
declassified.  CIA, Request for Records Disposition Authority, NC1-263-85-1, Mar. 26, 
1985, available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/851.pdf [hereinafter CIA General Records 
Schedule]. 
 137. Krauskopf Memo, supra note 136, at 3 (emphasis added). In 2008, NARA and the 
CIA entered into a Memorandum of Understanding establishing procedures for the treatment 
of CIA records in NARA custody, which is available at http://www.archives.gov/ 
declassification/mou-nara-cia-2008.pdf. 
 138. According to CIA representations in court filings the tapes themselves were held in 
CIA “operational files.”  CIA’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Contempt and Sanctions, ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 10, 2008) (No. 04-4151), 
at 1 [hereinafter CIA Opposition to Contempt Motion]; see also infra notes 177-78 and 
accompanying text. 
 139. The “Confidential” version of the DO records schedule was recently declassified. 
See CIA Directorate of Operations, Request for Records Disposition Authority, N1-263-87-
2, Aug. 16, 1989, available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/872.pdf [hereinafter DO Records 
Schedule]. 
 140. See Memorandum from Mike Miller, NARA Records Appraisal and Disposition 
Division, Review of DO Records, N1-263-87-2, July 1, 1988 (describing limited review of 
CIA records schedules and a sample of operational records), available at http://www. 
dcoxfiles.com/71.pdf.  The 2000 NARA Evaluation later noted that the “full criteria” for 
screening records “were briefly reviewed by NARA” and that they “appear[ed] adequate” 
but that “NARA should be afforded an opportunity to review these criteria in detail so it can 
determine whether or not they warrant revision.”  NARA EVALUATION, supra note 14, at 23. 
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be retained permanently.141  The “essential problem,” NARA noted, is that 
the CIA “requires that records be kept in a highly compartmentalized, secret 
manner in order to protect intelligence sources and methods,” but, at the 
same time, NARA “requires that a number of its archivists . . . need to know 
sufficient detail about [CIA] records to authorize their disposition.”142 
The DO records schedule resulting from this dispute that was approved 
by the Archivist in 1989 is crucial to the CIA’s treatment of the 
interrogation tapes.  In particular, the DO schedule provided that documents 
within the CIA’s “operational activity files” should be considered 
permanent records except for “duplicate and other non-record material” in 
the files, which was to be destroyed “when no longer needed.”143 
NARA evaluations raised serious concerns about the CIA’s application 
of these standards.  First, in its 2000 report on CIA records management, 
NARA noted that at DO field sites the CIA was taking the “position that 
field files are non-record,” which NARA noted was “contrary to the 
agency’s own internal guidance” which limited nonrecord material only to 
material falling within the three statutorily defined categories.144  NARA 
recommended that the CIA “[e]nsure that DO personnel at field offices are 
aware of the record status of the files they accumulate.”145 
Second, following the 2000 evaluation, NARA conducted a more 
specific and thorough review of the CIA’s “operational activity files” that 
was completed in early 2001.  This review determined that “all 
documentation from all [operational activity] files warrants preservation 
and eventual transfer to the National Archives.”146  The review concluded 
 
 141. See Letter from Kenneth F. Rossman, Director, Records Appraisal and Disposition 
Division, NARA to redacted recipient, CIA, at 1-2 (Dec. 6, 1988) (stating that if the CIA 
“cannot permit the examination of the records it recommends for disposal”  NARA has “no 
alternative but to make all of the records in these important series permanent”), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/6.pdf. 
 142. Letter from Kenneth F. Rossman, Director, Records Appraisal and Disposition 
Division, NARA to a redacted recipient, CIA (Aug. 1, 1988) (emphasis in original), 
available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/81.pdf. 
 143. DO Records Schedule, supra note 139, at Item No. 3; see also NARA 
EVALUATION, supra note 14, at 23-24 (describing screening of DO records). NARA noted 
that the CIA was specifically “interested in having [duplicate and non-record] material 
clearly identified as disposable in its schedule” despite the fact that “technically the agency 
has the authority to dispose of this material anyway” as a result of the federal records laws. 
Memorandum from Michael L. Miller, Records Appraisal and Disposition Division, NARA, 
Job No. N1-263-87-2, at 2 (Aug. 22, 1989), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/22.pdf. 
 144. NARA EVALUATION, supra note 14, at 39. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Letter from Michael J. Kurtz, Assistant Archivist for Records Services, NARA, to 
Edmund Cohen, Director, Office of Information Management, CIA, at 1 (Feb. 8, 2001), 
available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/governmentattic/8.pdf [hereinafter Kurtz Letter].  
This appears to be a follow-up from the earlier NARA evaluation. NARA EVALUATION, 
supra note 14, at 23-24. 
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that the CIA’s screening of the material in the operational files based on the 
“duplicate” and “nonrecord” language in the DO records schedule was 
result[ing] in the destruction of some files and documents that 
warrant permanent preservation.  We found instances where policy, 
management, development, and planning documents, as well as 
other significant documentation of a substantive nature, are being 
destroyed, even though the schedule only authorizes the disposal of 
duplicate and non-record material.  We also concluded that the files 
contain virtually no documentation that is non-record.147 
Although NARA acknowledged that the files did “include some records 
that related to administrative matters as well as duplicates of intelligence 
reports found elsewhere,” it found that “allowing the files to be screened for 
this material can lead to the disposal of records that should be retained, and, 
in fact, has had this result.”148  NARA concluded by stating that the CIA’s 
operational activity files “document some of the most important and 
sensitive activities of the U.S. Government and must be preserved intact.”149 
Such guidance, therefore, had been specifically highlighted to the CIA 
the year before it considered the record status of the interrogation tapes.  As 
a result of the NARA reviews, the CIA at some point began amending its 
records schedule governing operational activity files.  In August 2005, three 
months before the tapes were destroyed, NARA sent the CIA an email 
following up on the issue, stating “We would appreciate it if the CIA let us 
know what questions are still outstanding regarding the schedule for 
operational activity files.”150  In March 2006, four months after the tapes 
were destroyed, the CIA finally submitted the amendment to its records 
schedule governing operational activity files designating “all 
documentation relating to operational activities created or received and filed 
or appropriate for filing in any operational activity file” as permanent.151 
III.  THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE CIA TAPES 
The legal status of the tapes under the federal records laws became an 
issue immediately, albeit briefly, after the public disclosure of their 
 
 147. Kurtz Letter, supra note 146, 1 (emphasis added). 
 148. Id. NARA also concluded that “destroying duplicates and administrative 
documents results in a loss of context that adversely affects the research value of the 
permanent material.”  Id. at 1-2. 
 149. Id. at 2. 
 150. Email from David A. Langbart, Life Cycle Management Division, NARA, to 
Christopher J. Olsen, Chief, Records Classification and Management Group, CIA (Aug. 5, 
2005), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/governmentattic/5.pdf. 
 151. The revised CIA records schedule for operational activity files is available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/61.pdf (emphasis added). 
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destruction in December 2007.  Just days later, on December 10, NARA 
sent the CIA a letter, which expressly assumed that the tapes were records, 
requesting a written explanation for their destruction, stating: 
According to recent reports in the media, the Central Intelligence 
Agency destroyed video tapes of the interrogations of two al-Qaeda 
terrorism suspects.  As you are aware, no Federal records may be 
destroyed except under the authorization of a records disposition 
schedule approved by the Archivist of the United States.  We are 
unaware of any CIA disposition authority that covers these 
records.152 
The following day, Congressman Henry Waxman separately wrote to 
the Archivist asking for an opinion as to whether “the CIA’s actions 
violated the Federal Records Act.”153 
The CIA publicly responded in the press to the issue raised by NARA’s 
letter through CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield, who asserted “[t]he bottom 
line is that these videotapes were not federal records as defined by the 
Federal Records Act.”154  Before the CIA formally responded to NARA in 
writing, however, the DOJ initiated first a preliminary inquiry and then a 
criminal investigation into the destruction of the tapes.155  The criminal 
investigation resulted in the CIA declining to provide a written response to 
NARA’s “request.”156  From the perspective of NARA and the federal 
 
 152. 2007 Wester Letter, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added).  The letter asked the CIA 
to investigate the matter and report back to NARA within 30 days.  Id. 
 153. Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, to Allen Weinstein,  Archivist of the 
United States (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_cr/ 
waxman121107.pdf.  News articles and commentators also took up the issue briefly.   See 
Isikoff, supra note 9;  Steven Aftergood, Did CIA Violate Federal Records Act, SECRECY 
NEWS, Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2007/12/did_cia_violate_the_federal 
_re.html; bmaz, The “Other” Provision of the Records Act, EMPTYWHEEL, Dec. 25, 2007, 
http://emptywheel.firedoglake.com/2007/12/25/the-other-provision-of-the-records-act/. 
 154. Isikoff, supra note 9. The CIA supported this position by referring to D/CIA 
Hayden’s statement that the agency had determined that the tapes were no longer of 
intelligence value and “not relevant to any internal, legislative or judicial inquiries.”  Id. 
 155. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement by Attorney General Michael 
B. Mukasey Regarding the Opening of an Investigation into the Destruction of Videotapes 
by CIA Personnel (Jan. 2, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/January/ 
08_opa_001.html. 
 156. Letter from Joseph W. Lambert, Director, Information Management Services, CIA 
to Paul M. Wester, Jr., Director, Modern Records Programs, NARA (Jan. 10, 2008) (stating 
that “in light of” the criminal investigation, the CIA is “unable to respond to your request at 
this time”), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/10.pdf.  NARA responded to the CIA that 
it “understood that your detailed response may have to wait until other investigations are 
completed” but that the “case will remain open until we have received the report.”  Letter 
from Paul M. Wester, Jr., Director, Modern Records Programs, NARA, to Joseph Lambert, 
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records laws, the matter remained dormant for almost three years until 
November 2010, when the DOJ announced that it would not pursue 
criminal charges for the destruction of the tapes and NARA resumed its 
own inquiry.157  In a November 2010 letter to the CIA, NARA stated that it 
“must still receive a report of CIA’s own investigation” to determine 
whether an “unauthorized destruction” of federal records has occurred.158 
The CIA’s position on the record status of the tapes was clearly not 
formulated post hoc in response to NARA’s inquiry, but rather the issue 
was central to the CIA’s early analysis.  In particular, as described in the 
timeline above, the CIA determined as early as September 2002 that the 
“continued retention of these tapes” was “not required by law.”159  By 
October 25, 2002, the CIA announced the plan to destroy the existing tapes 
and to recycle one tape daily going forward.160  And by mid-January 2003, 
not only had the CIA’s position that the tapes were not records solidified, 
but the CIA was also “informing and reminding CIA officers of the 
question, what actions make the video tapes an official record,” presumably 
to avoid actions that might indisputably convert them into records.161 
The legal arguments underlying the CIA’s assertion that the tapes did 
not constitute records, and therefore that the destruction of the tapes was “in 
line with” the federal records laws,162 could take several possible forms.163 
First, the CIA could argue that the tapes did not fall within the statutory 
definition of “record” on the basis that the tapes were neither “preserved” 
nor “appropriate for preservation” for their evidential or informational 
value.  Second, the CIA could argue that the tapes, although technically 
satisfying the definition of record, nevertheless fall within the statutory 
exception for “extra copies of documents preserved only for convenience of 
 
Director, Information Management Services, CIA (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://www. 
dcoxfiles.com/16.pdf. NARA also responded to Rep. Waxman delaying NARA’s assessment 
of whether the CIA’s actions violated the federal records laws until after “the CIA has 
responded to NARA’s query.”  Letter from Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the United States, 
to Representative Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://www.dcox 
files.com/18.pdf. 
 157. 2010 Wester Letter, supra note 16. 
 158. Id. 
 159. October 25, 2002 Cable, supra note 38. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Jan. 12, 2003 Memo, supra note 50. The CIA returned to the question again in 
2004.  See April 12, 2004 Email, supra note 57. 
 162. D/CIA 2007 Statement, supra note 1. 
 163. While the CIA’s own internal legal analysis is not available, such arguments 
appear necessary not only to avoid the general statutory provisions of the federal records 
laws, but also more specifically the CIA’s records schedule for the Directorate of Operations 
that mandated permanent preservation of “operational activity files” except for “nonrecords” 
and “duplicates.”  See DO Records Schedule, supra note 139, at Item 3; see also supra notes 
143 to 151 and accompanying text. 
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reference.”  Third, the CIA could argue that the tapes were “working 
papers” or drafts used to prepare the “final” interrogation reports and that 
because the tapes did not contain unique, substantive information not in the 
“final” written reports, preservation was unnecessary. 
A.  The Tapes as Records 
The statutory definition of “records” includes several elements.164  First, 
records are “documentary material,” which is defined broadly to include 
“all books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or other 
documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics.”165  
As recognized by guidance from both the National Archives and the CIA, 
this definition can undoubtedly encompass audio-visual material including 
videotapes.166  The second element, that a record is “made or received by an 
agency” under “Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public 
business,”167 would also appear to be satisfied on the basis that the CIA 
“made” the tapes while conducting public business.168 
The final element of the “record” definition is the crux.  To constitute a 
record, documentary material must be “preserved or appropriate for 
preservation by that agency . . . as evidence of the organization, functions, 
policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the 
Government or because of the informational value of data in them.”169 
Determining whether the interrogation tapes were “preserved” is more 
complex than noting that they were eventually destroyed.  The issue instead 
is whether the destroyed tapes became records on the basis that they were 
initially “preserved” as evidence of the activities of the CIA or for the 
information they contained.  Under NARA regulations, for example, the 
term “preserved” is defined as “the filing, storing, or any other method of 
systematically maintaining documentary materials . . . by the agency.”170 
 
 164. 44 U.S.C. §3301 (2006); see also Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 
F.3d 1274, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (defining test for determining record status). 
 165. 44 U.S.C. §3301 (2006). 
 166. See 36 C.F.R. §1222.10(b)(2) (2010) (defining “regardless of physical form or 
characteristics” to mean “that the medium may be paper, film, disk, or other physical type or 
form”).  The 2000 NARA report noted that a CIA regulation “made it clear that records 
include all media, not merely paper.”  NARA EVALUATION, supra note 14, at 40. 
 167. 44 U.S.C. §3301 (2006). 
 168. NARA regulations define “made” as “creating and recording information by 
agency personnel in the course of their official duties.”  36 C.F.R. §1222.10(b)(3) (2010). 
 169. 44 U.S.C. §3301 (2006). 
 170. 36 C.F.R. §1222.10(b)(5) (2010).  The regulatory definition further notes that 
“preserved” covers “materials not only actually filed or otherwise systematically maintained 
but also those temporarily removed from existing filing systems.”  Id. 
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Despite the later assertion that the tapes were not records, the CIA’s 
early treatment of them provides a strong argument that the tapes were 
initially preserved and stored as records.  As early as April 17, 2002, just 
over two weeks after Abu Zubaydah’s arrest, a CIA cable directed that the 
tapes of Abu Zubaydah “should not [repeat] not be taped over” and that 
“[e]ach of the tapes should be collected, logged and labeled, and sent to 
headquarters.”171  An April 27, 2002, email between CIA officers that 
copied CIA attorneys expressly stated that the tapes of the interrogations 
“should all be catalogued and made into official record copies.”172  A May 
5, 2002, cable repeated the instruction “Please preserve all videos” and 
arguably further indicated the intent to preserve them for their evidential 
and informational value, noting that “they offer evidence of AZ’s 
condition/treatment while in [redacted] care that may be of value in the 
future (apart from actionable intelligence).”173 
In early 2003, the issue of whether the tapes were “preserved” or “filed” 
was further implicated by the CIA’s OIG’s “special review” which included 
a review of the video tapes.174  A February 7, 2003, email entitled “Request 
of tape copies,” for example, discussed “how to best accommodate a 
request for review of video tapes,” which appears to have been referring to 
a request by the OIG.175  The significance of such a request for purposes of 
the federal records laws is that if copies of the tapes had been provided to, 
and placed in the files of, the CIA OIG, such “filing” may have also 
converted the copies into “records” of the OIG.176  As the CIA OIG would 
later confirm, however, it subsequently reviewed the videotapes on-site at 
the facility overseas and “never had the videotapes or copies of the 
videotapes in their files.”177 
 
 171. See April 17, 2002 Cable, supra note 30. 
 172. See April 27, 2002 Email, supra note 32 (emphasis added). 
 173. See May 6, 2002 Cable, supra note 33. 
 174. See generally Rea Declaration, supra note 52. 
 175. A government index describing the Feb. 7, 2003, email entitled “Request of Tape 
Copies” discussing “how best to accommodate a request for review of video tapes, without 
complicating security issues” is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/72.pdf.  An 
additional government index describing a Feb. 7, 2003, email entitled “Tapes,” which may 
be referring to the same email or a related email and which concerned the “IGs anticipated 
tape review” is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/71.pdf. 
 176. This could be true even if the CIA considered the original tapes to be “nonrecord.” 
See 36 C.F.R. §1222.12(d) (2010) (stating that “[m]ultiple copies of the same document and 
documents containing duplicative information . . . may each have record status depending 
upon how they are used to transact agency business”). 
 177. Rea Declaration, supra note 52, at ¶4. The fact that the CIA OIG did not receive 
copies of the tapes subsequently had significant effects in the ACLU FOIA case when the 
Court in early 2005, unaware of the existence of the tapes and based on a CIA motion to 
narrow an earlier, broader order, limited the relevant portion of the CIA’s obligation to 
search and review “agency records” to “relevant documents that have already been identified 
and produced to, or otherwise collected by, the CIA’s Office of Inspector General.”  Order 
Granting CIA’s Motion for Partial Relief, ACLU v. Dep’t of Def. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005) 
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A final indication that the tapes were “preserved” as records arose in 
early 2008 following the public disclosure of the destruction.  In response to 
a motion for contempt in the ACLU FOIA case, the CIA specifically 
represented in a court filing that the “videotapes were held in operational 
files,” which potentially constitutes additional evidence that the tapes had 
been “filed” or “stored” within agency files and were therefore 
“preserved.”178 
Even if the tapes were not “preserved,” however, they would 
nevertheless have satisfied the definition of record if they were “appropriate 
for preservation” as evidence of the activities of the government or for their 
informational value.179  The meaning of “appropriate for preservation,” and 
who has the authority to apply it, has been controversial.180  Since 1990, 
NARA regulations have ceded discretion in applying the term to federal 
agencies by defining “appropriate for preservation” as: 
documentary materials made or received which, in the judgment of 
the agency, should be filed, stored, or otherwise systematically 
maintained by an agency because of the evidence of agency 
activities or information they contain, even if the materials are not 
covered by its current filing or maintenance procedures.181 
Subsequent court decisions that have addressed this issue, however, 
have held that the discretion of agencies to determine which documents are 
“appropriate for preservation” is subject to judicial review and is limited by 
 
(No. 04-4151).  Based on this order, the government subsequently argued that the ACLU 
FOIA case was not an impediment to the destruction of the tapes. CIA Opposition to 
Contempt Motion, supra note 138, at 1. 
 178. CIA Opposition to Contempt Motion, supra note 138, at 1.  The government 
argued, therefore, that the tapes fell within a FOIA exemption for CIA operational files.  Id. 
 179. 44 U.S.C. §3301 (2006). 
 180. See Schrag, supra note 99, at 113-126 (providing a detailed history of the waxing 
and waning of Archivist authority over determining record status).  In 1981, as a result of a 
dispute over who should determine the “record value” of notes of telephone conversations of 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the DOJ OLC issued an opinion that found that 
“[a]gencies retain a measure of discretion in deciding whether materials are ‘appropriate for 
preservation’” and that while the law requires agencies to comply with record disposal 
regulations, the Archivist “is not authorized to promulgate standards or guidelines that have 
a binding effect on the agency’s determination as to whether a document constitutes a 
‘record.’”  Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, to Allie B. Latimer, General Counsel, General Services Administration (Jan. 
13, 1981), at 5-6, available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/13.pdf; see also NARA TASK 
FORCE REPORT, supra note 92, at ¶4.5; Schrag, supra note 99, at 118-119. 
 181. 36 C.F.R. §1222.10(b)(6) (2010) (emphasis added). NARA’s original proposed 
regulations defined “appropriate for preservation” more forcefully, but ambiguously, as 
“documentary materials made or received that should be filed, stored, or otherwise 
systematically maintained by an agency because of the evidence of agency activities or 
information they contain.”  55 Fed. Reg. 740, 741 (proposed Jan. 9, 1990) (emphasis added). 
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the intent of Congress in formulating the federal records laws.  In 
Armstrong v. Executive Office of President, for example, the plaintiffs, who 
were journalists and private researchers, sued the Executive Office of the 
President, the National Security Council, and the Archivist to prevent the 
proposed destruction of government emails.182  The government argued, 
based on the fact that paper printouts of the emails had been preserved as 
records, that the electronic originals were not “appropriate for 
preservation.”183  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected the 
government’s argument that “agency heads have sweeping discretion to 
decide which documents are ‘appropriate for preservation’” and held that 
the federal records laws “surely cannot be read to allow the agency by fiat 
to declare ‘inappropriate for preservation’ an entire set of substantive e-mail 
documents.”184  The court determined that despite the government’s 
arguments that the emails were “nonrecords” that were “not appropriate for 
preservation,” they could not be destroyed except in accordance with the 
federal records laws.185 
Again, the initial decisions of the CIA in early 2002 to mandate 
retention of the tapes and to convert them into “official record copies” 
would appear to indicate a determination that even if the tapes were not 
ultimately preserved, they were, at least initially, “appropriate for 
preservation” in “the judgment of the agency.”186 
B.  The Tapes as Nonrecord Copies or “Working Papers” 
The CIA’s position that the tapes did not constitute records more likely 
reflects a determination that the written intelligence reports the CIA 
produced from, and about, the interrogations rendered the videotapes 
duplicative.  This argument could take two forms.  First, even if the tapes 
were initially preserved, or appropriate for preservation, as records they 
could have arguably been “stripped of that status” by falling within the 
statutory exception for “extra copies of documents preserved only for 
convenience of reference” thus making them nonrecords.187 
Second, the CIA might have treated the interrogation tapes as “working 
files” or drafts of the “final” intelligence reports.  In a briefing to Senator 
Pat Roberts in February 2003, for example, while disclosing its intent to 
destroy the tapes, the CIA noted that the tapes “were created in any case as 
but an aide to the interrogations.”188  The possible treatment of the tapes as 
 
 182. Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 183. Id. at 1283. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. 36 C.F.R. §1222.10(b)(6) (2010). 
 187. Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1283 (quoting 44 U.S.C. §3301). 
 188. A redacted copy of a Memorandum For Record describing the February 2003 
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working files is further enhanced by the fact that NARA, in its 2000 review 
of CIA records management, expressly encouraged the CIA to analyze the 
status of its files located at DO field sites, which it had been classifying as 
“nonrecord,” as working files.189  Under NARA regulations, working files 
can be discarded if they were not circulated and contain no “unique” 
information” not in the final version “that adds to a proper understanding of 
the agency’s” actions.190 
These two possible explanations – the tapes as nonrecord copies or 
working files that could be discarded – thus converge on a single issue that 
has been central to the CIA’s argument from the beginning: the extent to 
which the interrogation reports duplicated the tapes.  In its 2003 briefing of 
Senator Roberts, for example, the CIA described the OIG’s “comparison of 
the tapes with the cables describing the same interrogations” in late 2002 
and told Senator Roberts that “the match was perfect.”191  Further, D/CIA 
Hayden’s 2007 statement disclosing the destruction, when read in light of 
the subsequent assertion that the tapes did not constitute records, appears 
almost singularly designed to make the argument that the tapes were the 
equivalent of extra copies or working papers.  In particular, Hayden stated 
that although “[a]t one point, it was thought” that the tapes could verify that 
“other methods of documenting” the interrogations were – quoting without 
attribution the federal records laws – “accurate and complete”192 the CIA 
“soon determined that its documentary reporting was full and exacting, 
removing any need for tapes.”193 
 
briefing of Senator Pat Roberts, dated Nov. 30, 2004, is available at http://www.dcox 
files.com/judicialwatch/4.pdf [hereinafter Sen. Roberts Briefing]. 
 189. NARA EVALUATION, supra note 14, at 41-42.  CIA “working files” were, at the 
time of the 2000 NARA evaluation, governed by an agency-wide records schedule.  CIA 
General Records Schedule, supra note 136, at Item 18(a). NARA recommended revisions to 
the schedule while also recommending that the CIA treat files at DO field sites as working 
files. NARA EVALUATION, supra note 14, at 26-28.  The CIA subsequently created a new 
records schedule for working files, which the CIA signed in September 2002, the same 
month it determined that the law did not require the retention of the interrogation tapes. CIA, 
Request for Records Disposition Authority, N1-263-03-2, available at http://www.dcoxfiles. 
com/902.pdf. The schedule, which the Archivist approved in April 2003, assesses working 
files based on whether they are “accumulated at the Deputy Director level and above,” 
whether they “were coordinated outside the unit of origin,” and whether they contain 
“substantive” information and instructs that “substantive documents” be placed in the 
“appropriate official file,” but that others are to be screened annually and destroyed. Id. 
 190. 36 C.F.R. §1222.12(c)(2) (2010). 
 191. Sen. Roberts Briefing, supra note 188, at 2. 
 192. See 44 U.S.C. §2902 (stating that among the goals of the federal records 
management laws is the “[a]ccurate and complete documentation of the policies and 
transactions of the Federal Government”). 
 193. D/CIA 2007 Statement, supra note 1.  He further stated that “the interrogation 
sessions had already been exhaustively detailed in written channels.”  Id. (emphasis added) 
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The standard to be applied in determining whether a record is an “extra 
copy” was directly addressed in Armstrong v. Executive Office of the 
President.  As mentioned above, the Armstrong court considered whether 
treating hardcopy paper printouts of email messages as records would 
render the original electronic versions nonrecord copies “subject to 
unobstructed destruction.”194  The court framed the issue in this manner: 
“[T]he mere existence of the paper printouts does not affect the record 
status of the electronic materials unless the paper versions include all 
significant material contained in the electronic records.  Otherwise the two 
documents cannot accurately be termed ‘copies’ – identical twins – but are, 
at most, ‘kissing cousins.’”195 
In making this determination, the court applied a strict standard for 
“copies,” quoting Webster’s Dictionary definition as “full reproduction[s] 
or transcription[s]; imitation[s] of a prototype: . . . duplicate[s].”196  
Although the paper printouts were identical to the view of the original email 
on a computer screen, the court noted certain information contained within 
the electronic version would not always be available in the paper printout.197  
On this basis, the court found that “there is no way we can conclude that the 
original electronic records are mere ‘extra copies’ of the paper print-outs” 
and that finding otherwise would be “flatly inconsistent with Congress’s 
evident concern with preserving a complete record of government activity 
for historical and other uses.”198 
Beyond the basic fact that CIA intelligence reports of the interrogations 
obviously are not actual “copies” of the videotapes, the available public 
information appears in several respects to undermine the assertion that the 
tapes were duplicative of the intelligence reports and cables derived from 
the interrogations.  The CIA has acknowledged, for example, that it is “not 
 
 194. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
 195. Id. at 1283. 
 196. Id. at 1284 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 404 (2d 
ed. 1979)).  Such a reading might also be justified on the basis that in 1943, when the 
statutory language was added, “copies” may have referred to carbon copies.  See GARY M. 
PETERSON & TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON, ARCHIVES & MANUSCRIPTS: LAW 14 (1985) (noting 
that the copies for “‘convenience of reference’ clause was probably conceived as a cover for 
the extra carbon copies that many offices create and give to the drafters of documents”). 
 197. This included the fact that senders and recipients might be identified in a printout 
of an email by User IDs or nicknames (rather than full names) or by the name of a 
distribution list (rather than by the names of all of the individuals comprising that list).  
Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1284. 
 198. Id. at 1285 (emphasis in original).  Following up on its “twin” versus “cousin” 
metaphor, the Court found that since “the two versions of the documents may frequently be 
only cousins – perhaps distant ones at that – the electronic documents retain their status as 
federal records” and held that all federal records laws governing the “preservation of records 
still apply.”  Id. at 1283. 
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aware of any transcripts of the destroyed videotapes.”199  Even presuming 
that the content of the interrogations depicted in the videotapes was 
accurately reported in the interrogation reports, based on the CIA’s 
“profound interest in obtaining accurate information” and “in reporting that 
information accurately” for intelligence purposes,200 the lack of transcripts 
suggests that the reports did not duplicate all of the information on the 
tapes.  Indeed, it would be reasonable that the CIA would not include 
information in intelligence reports that was not relevant or useful to its 
intelligence operations.201 Information contained in the tapes that had no 
intelligence value, however, may well have had “administrative, legal, 
research, or other value” which the federal records laws are specifically 
designed to preserve.202 
Moreover, descriptions of the CIA OIG’s review in late 2002, on which 
the CIA’s argument that the tapes were duplicative appears to be based, 
indicates that the attorney reviewing the tapes appeared to focus on whether 
the interrogation techniques depicted in the tapes were adequately described 
in the cables and intelligence reports.203  Whether the review included an 
exhaustive comparison of the content of the interrogations (as well as non-
 
 199. Letter from Lev L. Dassin, Acting United States Attorney, S.D.N.Y., U.S. 
Department of Justice, to Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein, U.S. District Judge, S.D.N.Y., at 2 
(Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/Letter030609.pdf. 
 200. U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 478 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that the “profound 
interest in obtaining accurate information” from witnesses “and in reporting that information 
accurately to those who can use it to prevent acts of terrorism” provided government reports 
with “sufficient indicia of reliability” to allow them to be used as substitutes for live 
testimony).  That this should be true makes the fact, noted by the CIA OIG, that, despite 
having the videotapes available to ensure the accuracy of the interrogation reports, the 
interrogation teams stated that they “rarely, if ever, were used” to “assist in the preparation 
of the debriefing reports” both surprising and troubling. CIA OIG REPORT, supra note 24, at 
¶77. 
 201. CIA officers in the field, for example, advised headquarters in April 2002 that “if 
the primary purpose [of the videotapes] is to ensure capture of vital intelligence, the 
interrogation team is maintaining a careful log of all activities as well as keeping careful 
track of the intelligence obtained” and that the “mound of video tapes” contained “many 
hours of little if any information being obtained from subject” and that the field’s 
“preference [was] to be more selective and retain only those interrogations where actionable 
intelligence [was] gathered.” April 18, 2002 Cable, supra note 31. 
 202. 44 U.S.C. §3303 (2006).  In American Friends Service Committee v. Webster, 720 
F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the D.C. Circuit addressed a strikingly similar situation involving 
FBI field files.  The FBI, with approval from NARA, was retaining only “summaries of field 
office files” and destroying “the original documents upon which the summaries are based.”  
Id. at 65.  The Court stated that it did “not disagree with the government’s general point that 
the FBI may satisfactorily summarize much investigative data,” but that “the summaries 
need to account in some reasonable fashion for historical research interests and the rights of 
affected individuals – not just the FBI’s immediate, operational needs.”  Id. 
 203. See CIA Abu Zubaydah Report, supra note 17, at 7 (stating that the purpose of 
OGC review was “to confirm that the cable traffic accurately described the interrogation 
methods employed”). 
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interrogation portions of the tapes) is more questionable.204  A heavily 
redacted interview concerning the attorney’s review appears to indicate, in 
contrast, that the attorney was “listening to the audio for the tenor of the 
session.”205 
The unique value of the tapes is further evidenced by the fact that the 
CIA OIG’s review of the tapes came to different conclusions than the CIA 
OGC even about the interrogation techniques depicted on the tapes.  
Whereas the OGC found that the techniques on the tapes complied with 
DOJ guidance, the OIG concluded that the waterboarding technique on the 
tape “was different from the technique as described in the DOJ opinion.”206  
The OIG stated that “the difference was in the manner in which the 
detainee’s breathing was obstructed” noting that 
in the DoJ opinion, the subject’s airflow is disrupted by the firm 
application of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator 
applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner.  
By contrast, the Agency interrogator [redacted] continuously 
applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the 
detainee’s mouth and nose.207 
These are precisely the type of details that a video could confirm, but 
which a written record indicating only that a technique was applied for a 
specific duration may not.  The continuing importance of the tapes to 
provide an accurate record, and the inadequacy of the written cables in 
doing so, was highlighted by the DOJ’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility which noted in 2009 that “[b]ecause CIA video tapes of its 
actual use of the waterboard were destroyed by the CIA, a definitive 
assessment of how that technique was applied may be impossible.”208 
 
 204. Any such review would have been complicated by uncertainty about whether 
questions and answers depicted in the tapes were audible and accurately translated in the 
corresponding intelligence report.  The extent to which portions of the interrogations were 
conducted in English or the OGC attorney reviewing the tapes understood Arabic is unclear 
from public sources. 
 205. A copy of an interview report dated June 18, 2003, by the OIG of a CIA attorney 
regarding the review of the videotapes and a government index description is available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/18.pdf (emphasis added).  The interview concludes with the 
OIG asking whether the “conclusion that the tapes ‘confirm’ the cable traffic was 
overstated” and the attorney replying “that the tapes ‘tend to confirm what is in the cables’ 
and ‘do nothing to discredit any of the cables.’”  Id. at ¶14. 
 206. CIA OIG REPORT, supra note 24, at ¶79. 
 207. Id.  The OIG noted that “[o]ne of the psychologists/interrogators . . . explained that 
the Agency’s technique is different because it is ‘for real’ and is more poignant and 
convincing.”  Id. 
 208. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INVESTIGATION INTO 
THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON 
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 247 n.205 (2009). 
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In addition, certain intangible elements of an interrogation are perhaps 
impossible to describe exhaustively in a written record.  The updated Army 
Field Manual on interrogation states, for example, that “video recording is 
possibly the most accurate method of recording a questioning session since 
it records not only the voices but also can be examined for details of body 
language and source and collector interaction.”209 
Finally, the very concern that appeared to provide the final impetus to 
destroy the tapes was that a video of “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
would have a quality lacking in a written account.  According to an internal 
CIA email, for example, CIA officers indicated that “the heat from 
destroying [the tapes] is nothing compared to what it would be if the tapes 
ever got into the public domain” and that “out of context, they would make 
us look terrible; it would be ‘devastating’ to us.”210  Another CIA official 
was similarly quoted in the press stating “People know what happened, but 
to see it in living color would have far greater power.”211 
A final argument that the CIA might assert is that even if the 
intelligence reports and cables did not exhaustively reflect all of the content 
of the videotapes, the partial information contained in the reports 
nevertheless was sufficient to satisfy the CIA’s statutory obligation to make 
and preserve “adequate and proper documentation,” thereby making the 
preservation of the tapes unnecessary.212  The D.C. Circuit, however, in 
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, found this same argument 
“unconvincing” on the basis that it relies only upon the statutory provision 
that describes an agency’s basic duty “to create and then retain a baseline 
inventory of ‘essential’ records.”213  The argument ignores other parts of the 
federal records laws that “prescribe more particularized duties for agency 
heads that reach beyond their general obligation to ‘adequately document’ 
core agency functions” such as the “mandate that all records . . . whether or 
not related to ‘adequate documentation’” be preserved and that they can 
only be destroyed “in accordance with explicit statutory directives.”214  Or, 
 
 209. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM2-22.3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS 9-
11 (2006) (emphasis added).  Currently, this Army Field Manual governs any interrogations 
conducted by the CIA.  Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).  A 
revision of the DoD Directive on Interrogations notes the further value of videotaped 
interrogations for “the training of new interrogators, the periodic assessment of interrogator 
performance, reviewing interrogation reports for completeness, re-assessing the veracity of 
sources during questioning, monitoring compliance with policy and procedures, 
documenting the interrogation environment.”  DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE NO. 3115.09, 5 
(Oct. 9, 2008). 
 210. Email from redacted individual to Dusty Foggo (Nov. 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/aclu/10.pdf. 
 211. Mazzetti, supra note 29. 
 212. 44 U.S.C. §3101 (2006). 
 213. Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 214. Id. at 1286-1287.  The Tenth Circuit has similarly rejected the argument that the 
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put another way, the question of whether the CIA was obligated to 
videotape the interrogations in the first place215 is separate from the question 
of whether, the videotapes having been made, the CIA was allowed to 
destroy them.216 
Moreover, one could argue that, despite the fact that there was not, at 
the time, an express statutory obligation to videotape interrogations,217 the 
extraordinary nature of the Abu Zubaydah interrogations may have required 
videotaping even to satisfy the basic standard of “adequate and proper 
documentation.”218  The unique circumstances of these interrogations were 
evidenced by the active involvement of multiple federal agencies and the 
White House in the interrogation plan, the government’s expressed view of 
the importance of Abu Zubaydah in providing information necessary to 
protect the United States from terrorist attacks,219 and the request for a 
 
“adequate and proper documentation” language from 44 U.S.C. §3101 implies any “limit on 
an agency’s preservation responsibilities” and held that “[w]hen chapter 33 [of Title 44], 
entitled “Disposal of Records,” imposes duties with respect to records, it undoubtedly refers 
to all records defined by [44 U.S.C.] §3301 . . . not just the subset described in §3101.” 
Rohrbough v. Harris, 549 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). 
 215. The CIA’s position appears to be that they did not.  See, e.g., D/CIA 2007 
Statement, supra note 1 (stating that the CIA “on its own” began taping). 
 216. Agencies may often create many more records than are necessary to fulfill the 
basic duty of “adequate and proper documentation;” they cannot, however, destroy the 
“extra” records unless they are nonrecord, such as “copies maintained for convenience,” or 
unless a records disposal schedule properly approved by the Archivist allows it.  See Am. 
Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that agency and 
NARA recordkeeping activities are subject to judicial review and finding that destruction of 
agency records, approved by the Archivist, did not comply with federal records laws). 
 217. Federal law now requires the videotaping of at least certain intelligence 
interrogations.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-84, §1080, 123 Stat. 2190, 2479 (2009) (requiring “videotaping or otherwise 
electronically recording strategic intelligence interrogations” of person under the control of 
DoD). 
 218. Indeed, query whether the later recordkeeping requirement for the use of 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” that mandated only a written record “setting forth the 
nature and duration of each such technique employed” was sufficient to document, 
adequately and properly, the 183 applications of the waterboard on Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed. CIA OIG REPORT, supra note 24, at App. E, ¶5.  Cf. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 672 F. 
Supp. 2d 114, 118 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding the government in contempt for violating a court 
order to videotape a detainee’s habeas testimony stating that “a picture is truly worth 1,000 
words, and the full import of Petitioner’s testimony cannot be gained from the cold, dry 
transcript alone”). 
 219. See Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1569, 1571 
(Sep. 6, 2006) (stating that Abu Zubaydah “provided information that helped stop a terrorist 
attack being planned inside the United States”).  In Abu Zubaydah’s habeas case, however, 
the government recently stated that it was “not contend[ing] in this proceeding that at that 
the time of his capture, [Abu Zubaydah] had knowledge of any specific impending terrorist 
operations other than his own thwarted plans.”  Respondent’s Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery and Petitioner’s Motion for 
Sanctions, Husayn v. Gates (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2009) (No. 08-1360), at 35, available at 
http://www.truth-out.org/files/memorandum.pdf [hereinafter Opposition to Sanctions in Abu 
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specific opinion from the DOJ OLC.  Such an argument is strengthened by 
the requirement that “adequate and proper documentation” be “designed to 
furnish the information necessary to protect the legal rights . . . of the 
Government,” which risked being accused of violating treaty obligations, 
and the legal rights of those “persons directly affected by the agency 
activities,”220 which included not only the detainees being subjected to 
simulated drowning, but also government interrogators, who risked being 
charged with committing torture.  The surviving written record may be, in 
the end, inadequate to accomplish any of these goals, which raises a final 
issue about the tapes and their potential role as evidence. 
C.  The Tapes as Relevant Evidence 
The possible relevance of the tapes to specific legal proceedings or 
investigations, which may have triggered alternative legal obligations to 
preserve them, is beyond the scope of this article.  Yet such considerations 
are not irrelevant to the federal records laws.  First, as mentioned above, the 
law requires agencies to create records designed to protect the legal rights 
of both the government and individuals affected by agency activities.221  
Second, the evidential and informational value of government documents 
properly forms part of the determination about whether they are 
“appropriate for preservation” and therefore whether they satisfy the 
statutory definition of “record.”222  Third, once documents are determined to 
be records, the law requires both agencies and the Archivist to assess their 
“legal” value in considering their appropriate disposition.223 
The relevance of CIA records to legal proceedings is also specifically 
incorporated into a CIA records schedule covering “Records relating to 
actual or impending litigation or to matters under investigation by the 
Department of Justice or Congress.”224  The schedule instructs that such 
records should be retained or destroyed “in accordance with approved 
Agency disposition instructions for the records, or when litigation or 
investigation requirement has ended, whichever is later.”225  The provision 
was intended to be a standing “litigation hold” instruction by the CIA 
General Counsel “to assure that any records involved in litigation or 
 
Zubaydah’s Habeas Case]. 
 220. 44 U.S.C. §3101 (2006). 
 221. Id. 
 222. 44 U.S.C. §3301 (2006). 
 223. 44 U.S.C. §§3303, 3303a(a) (2006). 
 224. CIA General Records Schedule, supra note 136, at Item 5(d) (emphasis added). 
 225. Id. 
04_COX V17 FINAL (6-14-11).DOC  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/2011  12:10 PM 
170 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY  [Vol. 5:131 
investigations are retained until that requirement ends, their regular 
disposition instructions notwithstanding.”226 
The CIA’s assertion that the tapes were not records, despite their 
potential relevance as evidence, would arguably avoid such requirements, 
however.  This would then leave only ad hoc legal obligations arising either 
from specific preservation orders or the general duty to preserve relevant 
evidence.  D/CIA Hayden’s 2007 statement disclosing the destruction of the 
tapes asserted that the CIA had determined that the tapes were “not relevant 
to any internal, legislative, or judicial inquiries – including the trial of 
Zacharias Moussaoui.”227  Even if this assertion is true, however, it does not 
accurately describe the standard for the duty to preserve relevant evidence, 
which is triggered not only by pending, but reasonably foreseeable, 
litigation.228 
A thorough analysis of the latticework of legal positions the CIA has 
thus far asserted to argue that the tapes were not relevant to a number of 
proceedings,229 including Abu Zubaydah’s subsequent habeas case,230 
 
 226. See Krauskopf Memo, supra note 136, at 2. 
 227. D/CIA 2007 Statement, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
 228. See, e.g., West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(defining spoliation as the destruction of evidence “in pending or reasonably foreseeable 
litigation”); see also generally MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION 
OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION (2d ed. 2006).  Whether the relevance of the tapes to pending or foreseeable 
litigation at the time of their destruction was adequately considered is further called into 
question by the fact that, according to press reports, the CIA attorney who was consulted 
about “whether there was any legal requirement to keep the tapes” and reportedly advised 
that there was not, was Robert Eatinger. While Eatinger had formerly been the Chief of the 
CIA’s Litigation Division, at the time he would have provided this advice he was assigned to 
the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and, by his own account, had not had “any role in any 
CIA litigation” since April 2004.   Decl. of Robert J. Eatinger, Horn v. Huddle (D.D.C. Oct. 
23, 2009) (No. 94-1756), at ¶19. 
 229. In the Moussaoui case, for example, the government disclosed in December 2007 
that “recordings did exist for enemy combatant Abu Zubaydah” but argued that “[t]he 
district court ruled on January 31, 2003 [] that Zubaydah lacked material evidence, so he was 
no longer at issue when the district court raised the issue of recordings [of interrogations].” 
Appellee’s Response in Opposition to Appellant’s Motion for a Limited Remand Based on 
the Government’s Disclosure of Incorrect Declarations, Testimony, and Representations, 
U.S. v. Moussaoui (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2007) (No. 06-4494), at 16 n.9.  According to CIA 
spokesman Mark Mansfield “the tapes were not destroyed while the 9/11 Commission was 
active so that they would be available if ever requested for its report.” CIA Director: Agency 
Taped Terror Interrogations, Destroyed Tapes Over Leak Fears, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 7, 
2007.  The CIA determined, however, that the tapes were simply never responsive to the 
9/11 Commission’s inexplicably narrow document requests, which asked only for cables and 
“other reports of intelligence information obtained from interrogations” of Abu Zubaydah. 
Memorandum from Philip Zelikow to Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, Interrogations and 
Recordings: Relevant 9/11 Commission Requests and CIA Responses, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2007); 
but see John Radsan, When the Smoke Clears at CIA, 2 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 1, 8 
(Summer 2009) (stating that the author, a former CIA attorney, “knew someone in the [CIA] 
Office of General Counsel who said – to no avail – that the Agency should turn over its 
04_COX V17 FINAL (6-14-11).DOC (DO NOT DELETE ) 6/15/2011  12:10 PM 
2011] THE CIA’S DESTRUCTION OF ITS INTERROGATION TAPES   171 
 
remains to be written.  If anything, the cumulative effect of such arguments, 
however, is to illustrate the importance of the federal records laws in 
providing a baseline, institutional obligation to ensure the careful and 
proper disposition of all government records according to schedules 
approved by an outside, impartial authority – the Archivist. 
The publicly available facts about the decision to destroy the tapes, in 
contrast, mirror assessments made by corporate officers about whether to 
destroy incriminating documents when advised by counsel that they have a 
strong argument that a preservation obligation has not been triggered.  A 
leading treatise on the destruction of evidence (written, coincidentally, by a 
member of the 9/11 Commission) notes, for example, that “when the 
evidence itself is devastating and there is a strong argument that destruction 
is legal” then the risks of destruction, including possible adverse inferences 
for spoliation in subsequent litigation, may be “worthwhile.”231 
The federal records laws, properly applied, however, ought to make 
such assessments moot for government records.  Given the considerably 
broader pool of stakeholders in the preservation of government documents, 
the federal records laws in principle are designed to take decisions about the 
“risks” of destruction away from interested hands and place them into more 
objective ones.  As then Director of Archival Management Theodore 
Schellenberg, an early leader in the field, noted: “An archivist is not an 
interested party with respect to the preservation of evidence, whether 
favorable or unfavorable to an agency’s administration.  He will not judge 
of its partiality; he is interested only in preserving all the important 
evidence.”232 
IV.  BALANCING ARCHIVAL BOXES AND BURN BAGS 
Following the DOJ announcement that it would not pursue criminal 
charges for the destruction of the tapes, NARA moved quickly to resume its 
inquiry into whether an “unauthorized destruction” of federal records had 
occurred.233 As of this writing, however, the CIA’s public statements 
suggest that it does not intend to respond anytime soon.234  Calls for 
 
interrogation videotapes to the 9/11 Commission”).  For CIA arguments in the ACLU FOIA 
case, see supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text. 
 230. See Opposition to Sanctions in Abu Zubaydah’s Habeas Case, supra note 219, at 
63 (arguing that “the interrogation tapes are irrelevant to this case”). 
 231. JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE §9.2 (2010). 
 232. THEODORE R. SCHELLENBERG, MODERN ARCHIVES: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 
29 (1956). 
 233. 2010 Wester Letter, supra note 16. 
 234. See Isikoff, supra note 16 (quoting CIA spokeswoman Marie Harf stating that the 
CIA would not comment on the NARA inquiry because the DOJ “has not fully completed its 
investigation into the former detention program”). 
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Congress to reopen its inquiries into the destruction of the tapes have thus 
far gone unheeded as well.235  Congress, NARA, and the CIA must consider 
carefully the implications and consequences of the CIA’s legal positions for 
the ongoing and future preservation of the records of its intelligence 
operations.  Outlined briefly below are a few issues that such inquiries 
should address and some provisional thoughts on their resolution. 
As an initial matter, even for documents that are accepted as “records,” 
there can be a legitimate tension between the goal of preserving records and 
the goal of preserving the security of intelligence operations abroad.  The 
proliferation of extra copies and multiple files, which can aid in ensuring 
“accurate and complete” documentation, can be the enemy of information 
security policies that seek to keep the amount of classified material to an 
absolute minimum.236  NARA acknowledged this tension at CIA field sites 
which, NARA noted, received guidance from CIA headquarters not only 
about recordkeeping obligations, but also about requirements “stem[ming] 
primarily from security concerns” that are “geared to ensuring that record 
holdings are kept to a minimum and can be destroyed quickly in an 
emergency.”237 
The central issue is whether these interests are being properly balanced.  
Any classified document, by definition, poses a “security risk.”238  That 
justification alone obviously does not remove the possibility of less 
appropriate motives for destruction.239  Further, security risks presented by 
 
 235. See, e.g., Editorial, The CIA Tapes: Case Not Closed, WASH. POST., Nov. 12, 2010 
(stating that “Congress should step in to address myriad unanswered questions” about the 
destruction of the interrogation tapes). 
 236. See, e.g., DOD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM, supra note 104, at §6-101 
(mandating that “working papers containing classified information” shall be “[d]estroyed 
when no longer needed”). 
 237. NARA EVALUATION, supra note 14, at 39.  Legal guidance to an FBI field office in 
Islamabad, Pakistan provides a comparable example of the two goals juxtaposed. On the one 
hand, the FBI General Counsel advised the field office that “[i]n accordance with existing 
law and regulation” all offices must “retain and preserve documents, materials, records and 
other information related to the FBI’s knowledge, activities, and efforts regarding terrorism 
and counterterrorism before, on, and after September 11, 2001.”  Memorandum from FBI, 
Office of the General Counsel to All Divisions (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www. 
dcoxfiles.com/governmentattic/22.pdf.  On the other hand, the field office responded that it 
was “located in a high threat area.  The U.S. Embassy is now operating under a ‘zero burn’ 
policy.  Hard copies of some documents are maintained in the office space, however, if an 
emergency evacuation is necessary, all files will be destroyed in compliance with U.S. State 
Department policy. Therefore in all investigations . . . this office will not retain interview 
notes, evidence, or other documentation related to any case.”  Memorandum from Legal 
Attaché, Islamabad to FBI, Office of the General Counsel (Feb. 13, 2002), http://www. 
dcoxfiles.com/governmentattic/13.pdf [hereinafter FBI Legal Attaché Memo]. 
 238. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, Classified National Security Information, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 707,708 (Dec. 29, 2009) (describing classified information as information the 
disclosure of which would be “reasonably expected” to cause damage to national security). 
 239. See, e.g., Kronisch v. U.S., 150 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir. 1998) (questioning the 
CIA’s assertion that documents were “destroyed to preserve the confidential identities” of 
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classified records abroad can be minimized by well established information 
security procedures, such as moving sensitive materials to more secure 
locations.240  This was, in fact, the initial guidance provided by the CIA to 
the field in April 2002, instructing that the tapes “should be collected, 
logged and labeled, and sent to headquarters.”241 Instead, the CIA’s 
contrary actions of stockpiling the tapes first at a field location and then, 
according to press accounts, at a foreign CIA station for three years, 
arguably may have placed them at greater risk of loss or capture than if they 
had been quickly transported back to the United States for safekeeping as 
initially planned. 
Outlined below are suggested modifications to the law, intelligence 
community policies, and enforcement to address these concerns. 
First, Congress should consider legislation to clarify the extent to which 
it intends that the CIA has, or should have, any exemption from the 
requirements of federal records laws.  At the very least, such exemptions, if 
any, should be transparent and clearly stated in the U.S. Code.242  Even a 
belated examination by Congress of the CIA’s destruction of the 
interrogation tapes would provide a unique and concrete opportunity to 
assess the necessity for such exemptions.  Congress could consider, for 
example, whether the CIA properly determined that the preservation of the 
tapes constituted an unacceptable security risk that federal records laws 
failed to recognize or properly ameliorate.243  Congress may well determine, 
 
participants in a program and that the CIA’s justification may have also included “a fear that 
the documents would become the subject of litigation”).  Standard operating procedures that 
governed certain interrogations in Guantánamo instructed interrogators that once summaries 
of interrogations were created “handwritten interrogator notes may be destroyed” on the 
express basis that the interrogation “mission has legal and political issues that may lead to 
interrogators being called to testify” and that “keeping the number of documents with 
interrogation information to a minimum can minimize certain legal issues.”  Aff. of William 
C. Kuebler, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy, June 8, 2008, at ¶6, available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/kuebler-affidavit-6-8-08.pdf. 
 240. See DOD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM, supra note 104, at §6-303 (mandating 
emergency planning “for the protection, removal, or destruction of classified material in case 
of . . . terrorist activities, or enemy action, to minimize the risk of its compromise” and 
stating that such plans should consider the “[s]torage of less frequently used classified 
material at more secure locations”); see also STATE DEP’T, FOREIGN AFFAIRS HANDBOOK, 5 
FAH-4, at  H-315.2-2 (stating that records could be destroyed at foreign posts in an “extreme 
emergency” but noting that it is preferable to “safe haven” records to another location), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89250.pdf. 
 241. April 17, 2002 Cable, supra note 30 (emphasis added); cf. FBI Legal Attaché 
Memo, supra note 237 (stating that the FBI Legal Attaché in Islamabad “will not retain 
interview notes, evidence, or other documentation related to any case” but that “[a]ll of these 
items have been or will routinely be forwarded to the appropriate office”) (emphasis added). 
 242. See supra Part II.C. 
 243. In doing so, Congress would have to consider the fact that the same risks might 
argue for a similar exemption from the obligation to preserve records requested, for example, 
in Congressional investigations. 
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in contrast, that federal records laws adequately balance such concerns by 
providing all agencies with an emergency exception that allows the 
destruction of records located outside the United States “when hostile 
action by a foreign power appears imminent” and that a statutory exemption 
for the CIA, if it exists, is unnecessary.244 
Second, Congress should revisit the definition of records, the related 
concept of nonrecords, and the proper discretion agencies should have in 
applying such terms.  Congress could control misuse of the “nonrecord” 
category, for example, by expanding the statutory definition of “record” to 
encompass more, if not all, agency documents.  This would not force 
agencies to preserve “every scrap of paper.”245  Instead, descriptions of 
categories of what are now termed “nonrecords” could simply be added to 
either agency records schedules or general records schedules produced by 
the Archivist.  The practical effect for most agencies would be negligible, 
but the change would provide transparency about the variety and types of 
documents agencies are destroying as nonrecords and prevent documents of 
significant value from being destroyed as nonrecords without notice to, and 
input from, the Archivist. 
Third, the destruction of the CIA tapes should provide the impetus for 
policy, education, and training reforms across the intelligence community 
relating to federal records responsibilities.  The position of Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) appears ideally suited to provide a policy that is 
consistent within the intelligence community and avoid piecemeal 
measures.  Moreover, the burden of this action is diminished by the fact that 
the DoD has already introduced relevant reforms that the DNI could simply 
replicate across the broader intelligence community, including the CIA. 
In particular, the DoD examined the policies relating to videotaping 
interrogations throughout its components.246  The DoD subsequently revised 
its directive on “Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and 
Tactical Questioning,” to include a section on “Recordings of Intelligence 
Interrogations” which expressly discusses video recording of 
 
 244. 44 U.S.C. §3311 (2006).  This law also provides for accountability for such 
destruction by requiring an after-the-fact report to the Archivist of the United States.  Id.; 
Some have speculated about whether the CIA might have been relying upon this provision in 
destroying the tapes.  See Isikoff, supra note 9; The “Other” Provision of the Records Act, 
supra note 153.  This appears highly unlikely on the basis that it would be inconsistent with 
the CIA’s public statement that the tapes were not records.  Any attempted reliance would 
also be suspect on the basis that the danger to the tapes, which were reportedly held in a safe 
on the grounds of the U.S. embassy in Thailand, would not appear to be sufficiently 
imminent.  A FOIA request by the author to NARA for a copy of any such report filed by the 
CIA in relation to the tapes yielded no responsive documents, available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/narafoia.pdf. 
 245. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Al Pessin, Pentagon Reviews Policy of Videotaping Interrogations, VOICE OF 
AMERICA, Mar. 13, 2008. 
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interrogations.247  The Directive states clearly that “[o]nce the purposes for 
which a recording was made have been accomplished, the recording shall 
be disposed of only in accordance with a disposition schedule developed by 
the [Secretary of Defense] and approved by the Archivist of the United 
States.”248 
Such reforms within the DoD arose, in part, from interrogation tapes 
depicting detainee Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri that were destroyed by the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2004 and 2005.249  In contrast to the 
CIA’s unequivocal defense of the legality of the destruction of the Abu 
Zubaydah tapes, the DIA General Counsel and Inspector General conducted 
a joint investigation into the destruction of the DIA tapes that both 
highlighted the unique problems of intelligence community records and the 
resolution of such issues.250  The investigation found, for example, that the 
interrogation team “regarded the recordings as working materials similar to 
handwritten notes, destruction of which they believed was required when no 
longer needed for intelligence purposes.”251  The DIA investigation 
concluded, however, that the recordings “did not fit the definition of 
working papers” under NARA regulations and recommended both 
“submitting a report of records destruction to NARA” and “reviewing DIA 
and DoD regulations to clarify the definition of working materials.”252 
 
 247. See generally Dep’t of Defense, Directive No. 3115.09 (Oct. 9, 2008).  The 
Directive addresses the concerns of the CIA regarding the identity of interrogators by 
requiring that “[b]efore a video recording is disclosed or released to any person or entity 
outside the Department of Defense or the U.S. Intelligence Community, the identities” of the 
interrogators “shall be concealed.”  Id. at §10(e). 
 248. Id. at §10(c). 
 249. See Defense Intelligence Agency Memorandum, Congressional Notification – DIA 
Interrogation Recordings of Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri (Feb. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/eff/1.pdf; Defense Intelligence Agency Memorandum to Assistant 
to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight), Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report 
for the Period Ending 31 March 2008 (Apr. 24, 2008), available at http://www. 
dcoxfiles.com/eff/24.pdf. 
 250. Although the classified report has not been publicly released, a government 
summary of the DIA investigation report was produced in the criminal case, United States v. 
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, and it is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/4.pdf [hereinafter 
DIA Investigation Summary]. 
 251. Id.   While the DIA investigation summary noted that “[t]his belief was consistent 
with then DIA and DoD issuances concerning information security,” it is unclear whether the 
DIA report acknowledged that DoD issuances also included express guidance regarding 
compliance with the Federal Records Act.  See DOD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM, 
supra note 104, at §C6.7.1.1 (stating that classified documents “that are no longer required 
for operational purposes shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the 
Federal Records Act” and “appropriate implementing directives and records schedules”). 
 252. The DIA investigation summary indicated that DIA “later learned that NARA 
classifies the recordings as unscheduled records and the recordings should have been 
retained at least until a records schedule for the recordings was developed and approved by 
NARA.”  DIA Investigation Summary, supra note 250. 
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Finally, Congress should consider the adequacy of current enforcement 
mechanisms and consider providing NARA with additional authority to 
ensure robust oversight over agency records management.  Congress should 
specifically revisit, for example, provisions limiting NARA’s authority to 
inspect “restricted” agency records and policies without the permission of 
the head of the agency.253  Allowing agencies to restrict access even to 
properly cleared NARA staff, whose statutory duties should provide a 
requisite “need to know,” impairs compliance by NARA and the relevant 
federal agency with the requirements of the federal records laws.254 While 
currently lacking the personnel and the funding to undertake a more active 
role in enforcement, NARA has the requisite expertise and should have the 
requisite objectivity. 
As a last resort, private enforcement remains an option recognized by 
the courts, and it is one that Congress should not disturb.255  If DOJ and 
NARA do not act, the courts have recognized a limited right of action by 
individuals to force DOJ and NARA to fulfill their statutory 
responsibilities.256  The courts have noted the need for some form of judicial 
review, in part because of the inherent conflicts that can arise.  In American 
Friends, for example, which involved the destruction of FBI field office 
documents with the approval of NARA, the court noted that the “allegedly 
illegal destruction is attributed to the very agencies in charge of filing suit 
to protect records,” namely NARA and the FBI (as part of the DOJ).257  The 
court concluded that in such a situation “it is highly unlikely that Congress 
intended the exclusive remedy to be a Justice Department suit to recover the 
records (and to have the remedy triggered by FBI or [Archivist] notification 
of improper records removal).”258 
 
 253. See 44 U.S.C. §2906(a)(2) (stating that “[r]ecords, the use of which is restricted . . 
. for reasons of national security . . . shall be inspected” by the Archivist “subject to the 
approval of the head of the agency concerned or of the President”); see also Am. Friends 
Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the District Court 
did not have the power to order a NARA review of restricted FBI records “because neither 
the FBI Director nor the President has approved inspection by the Archives”). 
 254. This issue was a point of contention between NARA and the CIA in the initial 
approval of the CIA schedule for the Directorate of Operations.  See, e.g., Letter from 
Kenneth F. Rossman, Director, Records Appraisal and Disposition Division, NARA, to CIA 
(recipient identity redacted) (Apr. 26, 1988) (noting that the CIA would not permit NARA 
archivists to examine relevant CIA files and stating that NARA’s “position remains that the 
NARA appraisal process constitutes a valid ‘need to know”), available at http://www. 
dcoxfiles.com/26.pdf. 
 255. See Schrag, supra note 99, at 140 n.252 (stating that “several officials of the 
Archives” had told the author “off the record, that one court order usually had more effect in 
getting an agency to adopt good records preservation practices than decades of regulating 
and cajoling by National Archives personnel”). 
 256. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
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Similar concerns exist with respect to the CIA tapes, given that the 
DOJ, as the government’s litigation counsel, has obligations to both advise 
and supervise its client in the preservation of relevant evidence.259  A joint 
letter from Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator Arlen Specter, for example, 
to then Attorney General Mukasey regarding the destruction of the CIA 
tapes demanded “a complete account of the Justice Department’s own 
knowledge of and involvement with these matters.”260 
CONCLUSION 
The end of the DOJ’s criminal investigation should not be the end, but 
the beginning of the inquiry into the CIA’s destruction of the Abu 
Zubaydah tapes.  The unquestioned importance of the tapes and the CIA’s 
troubling treatment of them as nonrecords raise a red flag that Congress and 
NARA cannot and should not ignore.  The issue of records preservation 
policies is too often overlooked.  A NARA task force in 1988 recommended 
various legislative changes and noted that amendments to the federal 
records laws “will have a better chance for passage as a correction to a 
perceived problem” such as following the document preservation issues 
raised “in the [then] recent Iran-Contra hearings.”261  The destroyed CIA 
tapes provide just such an opportunity, and it should not be squandered.  
Moreover, the issue is one that properly should have bipartisan appeal, 
since the preservation of records is crucial not only to the rights of 
detainees, but to intelligence personnel and to future intelligence operations.  
The debate should be framed in a manner that acknowledges that this issue 
is not primarily about investigating a past event, but rather about finding the 





 259. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 431-434 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (describing the duties of counsel to supervise a client’s preservation of evidence). 
 260. Leahy/Specter Letter, supra note 2 (emphasis added).  There are many connections 
linking some DOJ officials to the CIA tapes.  For example, Attorney General Mukasey 
selected Kenneth L. Wainstein to conduct the preliminary inquiry into the destruction of the 
tapes.  In June 2005, just months before the tapes were destroyed, Wainstein had been one of 
the attorneys on a DOJ brief filed in a Guantánamo habeas case that opposed a detainee’s 
motion for an order requiring the preservation of evidence relevant to his case. DOJ 
represented that “respondents are well aware of their obligation not to destroy evidence that 
may be relevant in pending litigation” Respondents’ Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion for 
Preservation Order, Abdullah v. Bush, (D.D.C. Jun. 7, 2005) (No. 05-23) (emphasis in 
original). This was the same case in which the court, after issuing a 2005 preservation order, 
then found that the detainee had “made a sufficient showing” that the destruction of the CIA 
videotapes violated the order. Abdullah v. Bush, 534 F. Supp. 2d 22, 23 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 261. NARA TASK FORCE, supra note 92, at 22. 
